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Contracts and the Constitution  
in Conflict: Why Judicial  
Deference to Religious Upbringing 




When a Hasidic person files for divorce under New York law, 
either party to the marriage may invoke a declaratory judgment ac-
tion to establish certain rights in a settlement agreement.  If children 
are involved, such an agreement may include a religious upbringing 
clause, dictating that the child is to be raised in accordance with 
their then-existing religion—Hasidism.  Deviation from the contract 
risks removal from the aberrant parent who intentionally or unwit-
tingly allows the child to wane into secularism.  Although the child’s 
best interest is the cornerstone of custodial analysis, a problem 
emerges when his or her best interest is couched inside a religious 
framework, frequently leaving the court upholding continued Ha-
sidic practice above all else.  Because the First Amendment requires 
government neutrality in religious disputes, a contract mandating 
religious enforcement leaves the court in a bind, stuck between a 
constitutional rock and a religious hard place.  This Note explores 
the potential constitutional and contractual conflicts implicated by 
enforcing religious upbringing clauses in child custody disputes, 
specifically in lower New York courts, as a result of deferring to 
religious upbringing clauses. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Picture this: you are a vulnerable teenage girl, betrothed to a stranger you 
have met only once.1  You have no real agency in the agreement, so its con-
summation is nothing short of rape.2  Your vows develop less into an infinity 
of marital bliss, than into a grim, icy domicile.3  The space between you is 
furnished not with roses, rhymes, and anecdotal tales recounting the ways he 
loves thee, but with flying fists, lonely nights, and unilateral governance.4  
You do not get to decide to leave, he decides if he wants to set you free.5  
Worse yet, your confinement is reinforced by a second prison outside the 
home: your own community.6 
 
 1. See Sara Stewart, I Was a Hasidic Jew – But I Broke Free, N.Y. POST (Feb. 7, 2012), https://ny-
post.com/2012/02/07/i-was-a-hasidic-jew-but-i-broke-free/; Tzack Yoked, ‘It Felt Like Rape’ // A Ha-




 2. See Yoked, supra note 1. 
 3. See id. 
 4. See id.; Etty Ausch, How I Left My Hasidic Jewish Community & Found My Sexuality, 
REFINERY29 (Jan. 9, 2018, 8:30 AM), https://www.refinery29.com/en-us/orthodox-judiasm-sexual-
ity-leaving-hasidic-community/ (discussing her “loveless, lonely marriage”); Josefin Dolsten, Net-
flix’s Unkindest Cut in “One of Us,” N.Y. JEWISH WK. (Mar. 7, 2018), https://jewishweek.timesofis-
rael.com/netflixs-unkindest-cut-in-one-of-us/. 
 5. See Masri v. Masri, 50 N.Y.S.3d 801, 802 (Sup. Ct. 2017).  Under Jewish law, after the divorce 
is finalized, the woman is required to receive a “get” from her ex-husband in order to remarry.  Id.  
Without it, she remains an “‘agunah’ (a ‘tied’ woman).”  Aflalo v. Aflalo, 685 A.2d 523, 527 (N.J. 
1996).  Whether the woman receives the “get” is typically within the sole discretion of the man, as he 
can defend his actions as a religious ritual protected by the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amend-
ment.  See id.  In Afalo, the Superior Court of New Jersey stated: 
It may seem “unfair” that [the husband] may ultimately refuse to provide a “get.”  But the 
unfairness comes from [the wife's] own sincerely-held religious beliefs.  When she entered 
into the “ketubah” she agreed to be obligated to the laws of Moses and Israel.  Those laws 
apparently include the tenet that if [the husband] does not provide her with a “get” she must 
remain an “agunah.”  That was [the wife's] choice and one which can hardly be remedied 
by this court. 
Id. at 531. 
 6. See Samantha Raphelson, When Leaving Your Religion Means Losing Your Children, NPR 
(June 14, 2018), https://www.npr.org/2018/06/14/619997099/when-leaving-your-religion-means-los-
ing-your-children (“People who leave the Hasidic community are often shunned by their family and 
friends, but they also are often forced to fight for their children.”); see also Ausch, supra note 4.  Not 
only is the community unsympathetic toward domestic violence, but elected officials have also “been 
accused of pandering to the Orthodox vote on issues like reporting sexual abuse.”  Dolsten, supra note 
4. 
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Detached from outside influence, this ultra-insular community permits no 
television, no internet, and no contact with the secular world.7  The only thing 
you have is your children, and they are the very thing you stand to lose by 
leaving, because not only will the community—including your own family—
band together against you, but the state would sooner grant full custody to an 
absentee father than a mother who lapses in religious practice.8  Far from be-
ing the stuff of nightmares, this is the reality for Chavie Weisberger, Etty 
Ausch, Sara Stewart, and countless other women who have gone “off the 
derech,” that is, left the Hasidic community.9 
Within the ultra-diverse boroughs of New York, Brooklyn has become 
home to over 330,000 Orthodox and Hasidic Jews.10  The strength of their 
 
 7. David Shamah, Rabbis Tell 60,000 in NY: Get Rid of the Internet if You Know What’s Good 
for You, TIMES ISR. (May 21, 2012), https://www.timesofisrael.com/rabbis-get-rid-of-the-internet-if-
you-know-whats-good-for-you/ (quoting senior Rabbi Wosner, who rendered the Halachic decision 
that within the Hasidic community, “there [is] no justification for Internet use at home under any 
circumstances”); see Sarah Maslin Nir, A Glimpse Inside the Hidden World of Hasidic Women, N.Y. 
TIMES (Sept. 19, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/19/nyregion/a-glimpse-inside-the-hidden-
world-of-hasidic-women.html (discussing restrictions on women in the Hasidic community). 
 8. See Sharon Otterman, When Living Your Truth Can Mean Losing Your Children, N.Y. TIMES 
(May 25, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/25/nyregion/orthodox-jewish-divorce-custody-
ny.html.  At the trial level, Weisberger lost custody of her children “largely because she had lapsed in 
raising them according to Hasidic customs.”  Id.; see Dolsten, supra note 6; Harriet Sherwood, Agony 
of Orthodox Jews caught between two worlds, GUARDIAN (Dec 2. 2018), https://www.theguard-
ian.com/world/2018/dec/02/disobedience-film-orthodox-jews-lgbt-rights-rachel-weiez (“He was an 
important man in our community.  My parents gave me hell on earth – they supported him, not me. 
My father made me feel ashamed of myself, disgusted with myself.  I’ll never get over that.”); see 
cases cited infra note 16 and accompanying text; Josefin Dolsten, Woman’s Sexuality Cut from Hit 
Netflix Documentary About Leaving Hasidic Judaism, TIMES ISR. (Mar. 9, 2018), https://www.timeso-
fisrael.com/womans-sexuality-cut-from-hit-netflix-documentary-about-leaving-hasidic-judaism/ (de-
scribing Etty Ausch’s attempt to leave the Hasidic community, in which “the Hasidic community 
band[ed] together, harassing her and raising money for her former husband’s lawyer”). 
 9. See Liana Satenstein, Off the Beaten Path, VOGUE (Mar. 8, 2018), 
https://www.vogue.com/projects/13541582/american-woman-style-after-ultra-orthodox-life/ (“When 
a woman comes out or is outed as not religious, she is at risk of being ostracized and having her 
children taken away from her.”); Yoked, supra note 1; see also Ausch, supra note 6; Stewart, supra 
note 1.  It is also noteworthy that men, as well as women, are in danger of losing their children for 
deviating from ultra-Orthodox practice.  See Otterman, supra note 8 (“Julie F. Kay, a human rights 
lawyer in private practice, said she knew of at least one court that issued an order denying a formerly 
ultra-Orthodox father visitation rights because he showed up to a parental visit in jeans, which are not 
permitted to be worn by the ultra-Orthodox.”). 
 10. Joseph Berger, Uneasy Welcome as Ultra-Orthodox Jews Extend Beyond New York, N.Y. 
TIMES (Aug. 2, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/02/nyregion/ultra-orthodox-jews-hasidim-
new-jersey.html. 
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presence has morphed the previously liberal profile of the borough into a con-
servative enclave.11  The insular community has strict guidelines for the way 
its women are expected to live.12  Despite the notable differences between the 
secular West and its ultra-Orthodox pockets, there are many women who are 
not only content with their religious lifestyle, but thrive in it.13  With that said, 
the heart of the legal issue rests not in Hasidism itself, but rather, the laws that 
make it difficult for women to stray from it.14 
When a child custody dispute arises in Hasidic families, courts frequently 
defer to the provisions provided in a divorce settlement agreement, in con-
junction with a “best interest of the child” analysis.15  If the settlement agree-
ment contains a religious upbringing clause—a document specifying that the 
children are to be reared in accordance with a particular religion—the court 
must give the document equitable weight in its multi-factored analysis to 
avoid violating the state’s neutrality requirement under the Establishment 
Clause.16  Further, under the Free Exercise Clause, parents have the right to 
practice a particular faith and direct their children’s upbringing in accordance 
with that faith, thus, to mandate a religious (or nonreligious) upbringing con-
stitutes government overreach.17 
This Note explores the potential constitutional and contractual conflicts 
 
 11. Id. 
 12. See generally Stewart, supra note 1 (discussing the general expectations of women within the 
Hasidic community, including the required style of clothing and lack of autonomy).  This includes 
wearing clothes that cover them from head to toe (including wrists and ankles), shaving their heads 
and wearing wigs, and having no permission to eat outside the home, or even to make contact with the 
outside world.  Id. 
 13. See Nir, supra note 7 (“The women . . . ‘take things that can be seen as gender roles and make 
it something special. They are making it their own, making it into something they are proud of.’”). 
 14. See Raphelson, supra note 6. 
 15. See Sajid v. Berrios-Sajid, 902 N.Y.S.2d 146, 147 (App. Div. 2010) (stating “[t]here is no 
‘prima facie right to the custody of the child in either parent,’” and “[t]he essential consideration in 
any custody controversy is the best interests of the child” (quoting DOM. REL. L. §§ 70(a), 240(1)(a)); 
see cases cited infra note 16 and accompanying text. 
 16. See Weisberger v. Weisberger, 60 N.Y.S.3d 265, 274 (App. Div. 2017) (explaining a case 
where the Appellate Division of the New York Supreme Court overturned the lower court’s decision 
to grant the paternal father sole residential custody, concluding that the religious upbringing clause of 
the divorce settlement agreement had improvidently been a “paramount factor” in the Court’s analy-
sis); see also Johnson v. Poway Unified Sch. Dist., 658 F.3d 954, 972 (9th Cir. 2011) (discussing the 
government’s obligation to remain neutral when considering religion under the Establishment Clause). 
 17. U.S. CONST. amend. I; see S.E.L. v. J.W.W., 541 N.Y.S.2d 675, 677 (Fam. Ct. 1989). 
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implicated by enforcing religious upbringing clauses in child custody dis-
putes.18  More specifically, this Note examines constitutional violations in 
lower New York courts as a result of deferring to religious upbringing 
clauses.19  Part II discusses the historical background to prevailing law.20  Part 
III explores how precedential child custody cases within the jurisdiction have 
handled religion, both with and without religious upbringing clauses.21  Part 
IV analyzes this by discussing whether the Establishment Clause and Free 
Exercise clause are violated by mandating religious practice.22  Finally, Part 
V concludes by setting the constitutional standard for navigating religious up-
bringing documents in child custody disputes.23 
II. BACKGROUND: DIVORCE SETTLEMENT AGREEMENTS AND  
THE FIRST AMENDMENT 
When a Hasidic person files for divorce under New York law, either party 
to the marriage may invoke a declaratory judgment action to establish certain 
rights in a settlement agreement.24  In such communities, the agreement is 
negotiated in a secular court, or in the Beth Din,25 and if children are involved, 
such an agreement may include a religious upbringing clause.26  The clause 
dictates that the children are to be raised in accordance with their then-existing 
religion, deviation from which risks removal from the aberrant parent.27 
Although the child’s best interest is the cornerstone of custodial analysis, 
 
 18. See infra Part IV, V. 
 19. See infra Part III, IV.  This can be determined by comparing those decisions to appellate level 
decisions within the jurisdiction.  See id. 
 20. See infra Part II. 
 21. See infra Part III. 
 22. See infra Part IV. 
 23. See infra Part V. 
 24. 43 N.Y. JUR. 2D DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS § 115. 
 25. The Beth Din is a Jewish court. See Beth Din, RABBINICAL COUNCIL OF CALIFORNIA, 
https://rccvaad.org/beth-din/ (last visited Jan. 5, 2019).  The Beth Din offers a full range of Jewish 
court services, such as Jewish divorce and marriage services, similar to secular court.  Id. 
 26. See Raphelson, supra note 6; Weisberger v. Weisberger, 60 N.Y.S.3d 265, 274 (App. Div. 
2017).  Such agreements are legally binding because New York courts deem these documents as en-
forceable contracts.  See id.  In these communities, such documents are typically signed at the time of 
divorce and may include other antenuptial arrangements, aside from the religious upbringing of the 
children.  See id. 
 27. See Raphelson, supra note 6.  While the law does not permit this standard for removal, lower 
New York courts have nonetheless mistakenly applied the law in shifting parental custody for viola-
tions of the settlement agreements.  See Weisberger, 60 N.Y.S.3d at 274. 
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a problem emerges when his or her best interest is couched inside a religious 
framework.28  That is, when maintaining what the courts refer to as the status 
quo (continued Hasidic practice) is “upheld [by the court] above all else.”29  
Thus, whilst divorce settlements with such clauses are legally binding con-
tracts, their enforcement raises the following key issues:30 whether giving un-
due weight to the religious upbringing clause over other custodial factors vi-
olates the Establishment Clause, and whether compelling a parent to raise 
their child in a particular manner to gain custody violates the Free Exercise 
Clause.31 
A. The First Amendment in Child Custody Disputes 
Under the First Amendment, United States citizens are guaranteed free-
dom of religion.32  The Supreme Court has implicitly bifurcated the Amend-
ment into two clauses—the Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise 
Clause.33  The Establishment Clause requires that the government “shall make 
no law respecting an establishment of religion.”34  Therefore, rather than 
adopting a policy in favor of church or state, the Establishment Clause divests 
the government of authority to do so.35  The Free Exercise Clause, on the other 
hand, provides that “the government may not ‘prohibit[] the free exercise’ of 
religion.”36  Read in the context of child custody disputes, this means that the 
 
 28. See Raphelson, supra note 6. 
 29. See id. 
 30. See Bailey v. Mann, 895 N.E.2d 1215, 1217 (Ind. 2008).  “Settlement agreements become 
binding contracts when incorporated into [a marriage] dissolution decree and are interpreted according 
to the general rules for contract construction.”  Id. 
 31. See discussion infra Part IV. 
 32. See discussion infra Part IV. 
 33. See Carl H. Esbeck, Religion and the First Amendment: Some Causes of the Recent Confusion, 
42 WM. & MARY L. REV. 883, 897–98 (2001). 
 34. U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 35. John C. Jeffries Jr. & James E. Ryan, A Political History of the Establishment Clause, 100 
MICH. L. REV. 279, 292 (2001).  Thus, short of embracing church-state jurisprudence, the Establish-
ment Clause “merely reflect[s] a determination that the issue be settled locally.”  Id. at 293. 
 36. Newdow v. Peterson, 753 F.3d 105, 108 (2d Cir. 2014).  Under the Free Exercise Clause, the 
oversight of a religious upbringing clause also impedes on the aggrieved parent’s right to direct the 
child’s upbringing according to their faith.  See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 213–14 (1972) 
(discussing how the Free Exercise Clause is tied to the “traditional interest of parents with respect to 
the religious upbringing of their children,” and finding that “the values of parental direction of the 
religious upbringing and education of their children in their early and formative years have a high 
place in our society”).  As such, to deprive a parent the right to raise their child by a particular faith 
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court may not prejudice the right of parents to direct the religious upbringing 
of their children.37 
1. The Establishment Clause 
Developing in the mid-twentieth century on the coattails of the Supreme 
Court’s radical separation between church and state, the Establishment Clause 
intended to effectuate a constitutional prohibition on governmental aid to re-
ligious schools.38  Since then, the breadth of separationist scope has extended 
to require, amongst other things, religious apathy in disputes over child cus-
tody.39  Accordingly, two relevant questions emerge.40  First, to what extent 
may the court consider religion in a custody dispute when no contractual pro-
vision exists to determine his or her upbringing; and second, when such a con-
tract does exist, how much weight may a court afford it.41 
When no contract exists, in the form of a divorce settlement agreement or 
otherwise, the court’s paramount consideration is the “best interest” of the 
child.42  As part of the “best interest” analysis, the court may or may not con-
sider religion.43  When a divorce settlement agreement exists with a religious 
 
would constitute an equally egregious constitutional oversight.  See id. 
 37. See Wisconsin, 406 U.S. 205 at 233.  While this Note focuses on the Free Exercise Clause in 
conjunction with the Establishment Clause, the relationship between free exercise rights and parents’ 
Fourteenth Amendment substantial due process right to direct the upbringing of their children have 
historically been closely linked—sometimes even confused.  See Jay S. Bybee, Substantive Due Pro-
cess and Free Exercise of Religion: Meyer, Pierce, and the Origins of Wisconsin v. Yoder, 25 CAP. 
U. L. REV 887, 891 (1996).  In the interest of brevity, this Note does not discuss any Fourteenth 
Amendment issues.  See infra Part IV. 
 38. See MICH. L. REV. ASS’N, The Establishment Clause and Religion in Child Custody Disputes: 
Factoring Religion into the Best Interest Equation, 82 MICH. L. REV 1702, 1704 (1984). 
 39. See id. at 1702. 
 40. See id.; infra Part IV. 
 41. See infra Part IV; see cases cited supra note 16 and accompanying text.  Put another way, the 
second question asks in what way does the contract shape the scope of the analysis.  Compare MICH. 
L. REV. ASS’N, supra note 38, at 1702 (contemplating religion in child custody disputes when no 
contract exists), with Weisberger v. Weisberger, 60 N.Y.S.3d 265, 275 (App. Div. 2017) (overturning 
the lower court’s decision to grant the paternal father custody after excess weight was given to the 
religious upbringing clause). 
 42. See MICH. L. REV. ASS’N, supra note 38, at 1702.  Judges are typically awarded broad discre-
tion to determine what constitutes the best interest of the child.  Id. 
 43. Id.  Although six statutes require religion to be considered in a child custody dispute, it is 
otherwise typically within the court’s discretion to consider religion as a factor, absent a contract that 
compels it to do so.  Id. 
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upbringing provision, however, the court is obligated to consider it under con-
tract law, presenting greater difficulty in determining the extent of its influ-
ence and pitting contractual provisions against constitutional law.44  In both 
instances, however, the overarching evil that the Establishment Clause seeks 
to avoid is government overreach in private, religious affairs.45 
To avoid such an evil, the Establishment Clause regards denominational 
preference (lending favor to one religion competing with another) as “suspect 
and . . . subject to strict scrutiny.”46  The Supreme Court has routinely stated 
that the Establishment Clause also prohibits the government from favoring 
religion to nonreligion.47  In child custody cases, the constitutionality of pre-
ferring a religious parent to a nonreligious parent can be analyzed under the 
Lemon test.48  The Lemon test requires that: (1) the law “have a secular legis-
lative purpose”; (2) its principle effect “neither advance[s] nor inhibit[s] reli-
gion”; and (3) it may “not foster ‘an excessive government entanglement with 
religion.’”49  In application, it becomes apparent that favoring the religious 
parent almost always violates the Establishment Clause based on a failure to 
meet the second prong.50  That is, since choosing a custodian on the grounds 
of religious preference has the proscribed effect of advancing religion, it typ-
ically does not pass constitutional muster under the Lemon test.51  In sum, 
courts may consider a religious upbringing clause as a factor in child custody 
disputes, but may not give it undue weight.52 
 
 44. See cases cited supra note 16 and accompanying text.  These considerations will be fleshed 
out in Part IV of this Note.  See infra Part IV. 
 45. U.S. CONST. amend. I; see Jason S. Marks, What Wall? School Vouchers and Church-State 
Separation After Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 58 J. MO. B. 354, 362 (2002) (“[T]he Establish-
ment Clause is inherently anti-majoritarian, designed to protect religious minorities from the tyranny 
of the majority.”). 
 46. See MICH. L. REV. ASS’N, supra note 38, at 1703–04.  This strict scrutiny standard emerges in 
Larson, discussed below.  See infra Part III.B. 
 47. See MICH. L. REV. ASS’N supra note 38, at 1707. 
 48. Id. at 1708; Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971).  The Lemon test, however, does not 
exclusively apply to child custody cases, as depicted in Larson.  See case discussion infra note 76. 
 49. See MICH. L. REV. ASS’N, supra note 38, at 1708. 
 50. Id. at 1719. 
 51. Id.  There is an exception to this rule under Larson.  See discussion infra Section III.B, Part 
IV. 
 52. See cases cited supra note 16 and accompanying text.  Although the Establishment Clause does 
not preclude the government from assessing religion in a multi-factored analysis, it does “re-
quire[] . . . ‘governmental neutrality’—'neutrality between religion and religion, and between religion 
and nonreligion.’”  Johnson v. Poway Unified Sch. Dist., 658 F.3d 954, 971 (9th Cir. 2017) (quoting 
McCreary Cnty. v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844, 860 (2005)).  Therefore, giving undue weight to a religious 
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2. The Free Exercise Clause 
Juxtaposed to the Establishment Clause, the Free Exercise Clause states 
that Congress shall make no laws “respecting an establishment of religion, or 
prohibiting the free exercise thereof.”53  The Supreme Court has noted that the 
“free exercise of religion means, first and foremost, the right to believe and 
profess whatever religious doctrine one desires.”54  Entrenched in Free Exer-
cise jurisprudence is the notion that, in a child custody dispute, the non-cus-
todial parent’s right to exercise her religion—or no religion at all—cannot be 
abated by the court.55  Deferring to a religious upbringing contract, then, strips 
a party of their Free Exercise right by admonishing the parent to practice the 
designated faith in order to maintain custody of their children.56  In this way, 
a mother who lapses in religious practice by, for example, allowing her chil-
dren to watch television when the community strictly prohibits it, runs afoul 
of the contract and risks a custody war.57  Because the Free Exercise Clause 
specifically protects individuals from religious (or secular) restraint, the gov-
ernment cannot, at its behest, coerce a parent into exercising a particular faith 
to maintain unsupervised visitation rights.58 
 
upbringing clause violates the Establishment Clause.  Id.  Giving the religious agreement undue weight 
essentially means making religion a paramount factor—rather than a non-determinative factor—in 
assessing the best interest of the child, as the trial court mistakenly did in Weisberger.  See infra Sec-
tion III.C.1. 
 53. U.S. CONST. amend. I (emphasis added).  Under the Fourteenth Amendment, parents also have 
a substantive due process right to rear their children free of state interference, absent a showing of 
harm to the child.  Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000) (“The [Fourteenth Amendment's Due 
Process] Clause also includes a substantive component that ‘provides heightened protection against 
government interference with certain fundamental rights and liberty interests.’ . . .  [T]he interest of 
parents in the care, custody, and control of their children . . . is perhaps the oldest of the fundamental 
liberty interests recognized by this Court.” (quoting Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720 
(2000))).  In the interest of brevity, however, this Note does not discuss any Fourteenth Amendment 
issues.  See infra Part IV. 
 54. Emp’t Div., Dep’t of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 877 (1990). 
 55. See S.E.L. v. J.W.W., 541 N.Y.S.2d 675, 677 (Fam. Ct. 1989). 
 56. See id.; Otterman, supra note 8 (discussing Weisberger v. Weisberger, 60 N.Y.S.3d 265 (App. 
Div. 2017), where the court noted that Ms. Weisberger’s constitutional rights were violated “by re-
quiring her to pretend to be ultra-Orthodox around her children, even though she was no longer reli-
gious, in order to spend unsupervised time with them”). 
 57. Otterman, supra note 8.  The Judge in Weisberger asked Ausch—whose children were placed 
in custody of relatives—a series of question about her general fitness as a parent, including whether 
the fuzzy socks she purchased for her children were related to Christmas, and whether she permitted 
her children to watch a Christmas show.  Id. 
 58. Granville, 530 U.S. at 57; see Otterman, supra note 8 (explaining that in Weisberger, the New 
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B. Contractual Issues 
The counter to this premise—that the government cannot mandate a par-
ent to act in accordance with a particular faith—is that the lamenting party 
contracted away her constitutional rights when agreeing to the divorce settle-
ment.59  While a party may, on occasion, waive her constitutional rights, de-
fenses nonetheless apply to the contract’s enforceability when it is clear that 
one party was not privy to the contract’s terms.60  Lani Santo, a director of 
social services in the Brooklyn borough, explains that “in almost every case 
of individuals61 who are choosing to leave [the Hasidic commu-
nity] . . . . [t]here’s almost always a contested divorce. . . .  [In which] people 
are signing things that are not explained to them.”62  Furthermore, unlike cer-
tain individual rights, because the Establishment Clause is a structural re-
straint on government, it may not be contracted away.63  For example, in child 
custody disputes where a court unduly deferred to the religious upbringing 
 
York Appellate Court ruled that “[the lower court] had erred in making religious observance the par-
amount factor when deciding custody”). 
 59. Jason S. Thaler, Public Housing Consent Clauses: Unconstitutional Condition or Constitu-
tional Necessity?, 63 FORDHAM L. REV. 1777, 1788 (1995) (“Although it is possible to con-
tract away certain constitutional rights, the agreement must be voluntary.  Courts routinely hold that 
an agreement is voluntary unless it is the product of duress.”). 
 60. See id. at 1789. 
 61. Although this could feasibly apply to either gender, prevailing controversies consistently de-
pict a Hasidic woman who is forestalled from leaving her husband by a communal effort to bolster his 
legal platform and leave her unsupported.  See Raphelson, supra note 6 and accompanying text. 
 62. Raphelson, supra note 6; see also Otterman, supra note 8.  Discussing the religious upbringing 
clause in her divorce settlement agreement, Weisberger states, “I don’t even remember seeing it.”  
Otterman, supra note 8.  If such an individual can prove that (s)he was taken advantage of, (s)he may 
be relieved of the improvident contract by presenting a valid defense, such as duress, unconscionabil-
ity, or undue influence.  See generally 17 C.J.S. Contracts § 3 (discussing the “effect of unconsciona-
bility or other defect in contract formation”).  Although these examples provide defenses to the con-
tract’s enforceability, there may also be an argument that no contract was formed for lack of mutual 
assent, since “an offeree, regardless of apparent manifestation of his consent, is not bound by incon-
spicuous contractual provisions of which he is unaware, contained in a document whose contrac-
tual nature is not obvious.”  Specht v. Netscape, 306 F.3d 17, 30 (2d Cir. 2002) (citation omitted).  
Without mutual assent, a contract cannot be formed, since “[m]utual manifestation of assent . . . is the 
touchstone of contract.”  Id. at 29.  Consequently, a party to a contract who has not had the terms 
explicitly explained to them may also present an argument that the contract was never initially formed.  
Id. at 29–30. 
 63. See Jessica Powley Hayden, The Ties that Bind: The Constitution, Structural Restraints, and 
Government Action Overseas, 96 GEO. L.J. 237, 243–44 (2007). 
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clause, a party’s consent to the agreement would not mitigate its unconstitu-
tional effect, as a party cannot consent to government overreach.64 
In sum, even if the religious upbringing clause is proportionately 
weighed, its enforcement may still constitute a violation of the custodian’s 
Free Exercise right to parent, and, if a waiver challenge is presented, a valid 
defense to the contract’s enforcement may apply.65  On the other hand, if the 
religious clause is disproportionately weighed, the structural restraint imposed 
on the government by the Establishment Clause survives a waiver challenge, 
since such constraints may not be contracted away.66 
III. CHILD CUSTODY DECISIONS IN PRECEDENTIAL NEW YORK CASES 
Over time, New York Courts have reached contradictory decisions in 
child custody cases, both with and without religious upbringing clauses.67  
Identifying the cause of this schism requires a review of neutral principles of 
law, the “best interest of the child” analysis, strict scrutiny standards, and rel-
evant case law.68 
A. Neutral Principles of Law and “Best Interest of the Child” Analysis 
When adjudicating cases that involve religious disputes, neutral princi-
ples of law typically govern in order to avoid offending the First Amend-
ment.69  This means that courts tend to apply “objective, well-established prin-
ciples of secular law to the issues.”70  In this way, judicial involvement is 
 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. 
 67. See infra Section III.A–D.  The most recent included decision with a religious upbringing 
clause is Weisberger.  See Section III.C.1.  The most recent included decision without a religious 
upbringing clause is Ausch.  See Section III.D.1. 
 68. Compare infra Section III.C (examining child custody cases in New York with religious up-
bringing clauses), with infra Section III.D (examining child custody cases in New York without reli-
gious upbringing clauses). 
 69. Congregation Yetev Lev D’Satmar, Inc. v. Kahana, 879 N.E.2d 1282, 1285 (N.Y. App. Div. 
2007) (“In [applying neutral principals of law], courts may rely upon internal documents, such as a 
congregation’s bylaws, but only if those documents do not require interpretation of ecclesiastical doc-
trine.  Thus, judicial involvement is permitted when the case can be ‘decided solely upon the applica-
tion of neutral principles of . . . law, without reference to any religious principle.’” (quoting Avitzur 
v. Avitzur, 446 N.E.2d 136, 138 (N.Y. App. Div. 1983))). 
 70. Id. at 1285. 
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justified when the case is decided “without reference to [any] religious prin-
ciples.”71  To avoid implicating Establishment Clause concerns, therefore, the 
court must instead defer to a “best interest of the child” analysis.72  This means 
that when a religious upbringing clause exists in a child custody dispute, 
courts in New York must not contemplate the propriety of the religious prac-
tice, nor the appropriate exposure to it, but instead the conduct of each parent 
in raising the children, particularly in light of the consistency provided in the 
child’s upbringing.73 
In assessing the best interest of the child, courts in New York typically 
consider a set of non-exhaustive factors, including the quality of the home, 
the quality of parental guidance, the ability to provide for the child’s intellec-
tual and emotional development, and financial status.74  When religion is im-
plicated in the custody dispute, it may be considered alongside other factors; 
however, it may not by itself be the determinative factor.75 
 
 71. Id. 
 72. Ervin R. v. Phina R., 717 N.Y.S.2d 849, 852 (Fam. Ct. 2000). 
 73. Id.  Within their analysis, courts may consider religion—or a religious upbringing clause—as 
one of the factors to determine what is in the best interest of the child.  Id.  In Friederwitzer v. Frieder-
witzer, 432 N.E.2d 765, 767 (N.Y. 1982), the New York Court of Appeals stated that “[t]he only 
absolute in the law governing custody of children is that there are no absolutes.”  Id.  In that case, the 
Appellate Court affirmed the lower court’s decision to award custody to the father because the mother 
was more interested in her own social life than her children, and because the mother’s actions “con-
fused the children and [were] contrary to their religious beliefs and detrimental to their religious feel-
ing.”  Id. 
 74. See Sajid v. Berrios-Sajid, 902 N.Y.S.2d 146, 147 (App. Div. 2010). 
 75. See Gribeluk v. Gribeluk, 991 N.Y.S.2d 117, 118 (App. Div. 2014).  Typically, religion is at 
issue and warrants contemplation in the best interest of the child analysis when the child has developed 
actual and specific ties to the religion, and those needs are consequentially best served by the practicing 
parent.  Id.  By itself, however, religion is typically not enough to swing the pendulum in favor of one 
parent, since credibility determinations play such a pivotal role in determining the best interest of the 
child.  Id.  In cases where religion is the sole determining factor of a child custody dispute, an Estab-
lishment Clause violation challenge would likely ensue.  See U.S. CONST. amend. I.  This is the chief 
evil sought to be avoided by the First Amendment’s separation of church and state.  See id.  Further 
shaping the scope of the child custody analysis is Article 10 of New York’s Family Court Act.  N.Y. 
FAM. CT. ART. 10.  The statute provides that a preliminary removal from the custodial parent is justi-
fied only by a showing of imminent danger or harm to the child.  Id.  In this way, religion as a deter-
minative factor must defeat Article 10’s extraordinarily high standard by demonstrating that absti-
nence from faith would constitute such imminent harm to the child as to justify removal from the 
non—or less—religious parent.  See id.  Typically, the standard for imminent danger is fairly high, 
and cases where only some harm is demonstrated are insufficient to pass statutory muster.  See Ni-
cholson v. Scoppetta, 820 N.E.2d 840, 852–53 (N.Y. 2004).  There, a group of mothers brought action 
after a trial court granted removal of their children solely because the mothers had not prevented the 
children from witnessing the domestic violence that they were victims of.  Id. at 842–43.  The Court 
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B. Larson’s Strict Scrutiny Test 
In Larson v. Velente, the Supreme Court introduced a new strict scrutiny 
test, holding that denominational preference is impermissible under the Es-
tablishment Clause except when it ties to a compelling government interest.76  
While the parameters of this compelling interest are not clearly delineated, its 
attenuated nature can be inferred from the exercise of strict scrutiny—the 
highest standard of review—underpinned by the Supreme Court’s conviction 
that government regulation should be rigorously scrutinized when it infringes 
on a protected liberty.77  In short, the Supreme Court concluded that the Es-
tablishment Clause prohibited the preference of one denomination over an-
other, except in the rare cases where denominational biases were justified by 
a “close[] fit[]” to a compelling state interest.78 
C. Child Custody Disputes with Religious Upbringing Agreements 
In the following two cases, the courts grappled with their latitude to in-
terfere in predetermined contractual arrangements surrounding the upbringing 
 
of Appeals of New York found that witnessing domestic abuse by itself does not give rise to a pre-
sumption of injury.  Id. at 854 (“[T]he risk of emotional injury—caused by witnessing domestic vio-
lence . . . must be a rare circumstance in which . . . the danger [is] so great that emergency removal 
would be warranted.” (emphasis added)). 
 76. 456 U.S. 228 (1982); see Jeremy Patrick-Justice, Strict Scrutiny for Denominational Prefer-
ences: Larson in Retrospect, 8 N.Y. CITY L. REV. 53, 54–55 (2005).  Justice Brennan delivered the 
opinion of the court in Larson and began his analysis by stating that “[t]he clearest command of the 
Establishment Clause is that one religious denomination cannot be officially preferred over another.”  
Larson, 456 U.S. at 244.  In that case, Pamela Velente sued the state of Minnesota for requiring, under 
“the Act,” that all registered charitable organizations soliciting money file annual disclosure reports 
with the Minnesota Department of Commerce (the Department).  Id. at 231.  The Department could 
then withdraw or deny any organization that engaged in “fraudulent, deceptive, or dishonest” prac-
tices.  Id.  Velente argued that the Act infringed on the Establishment Clause and violated the Lemon 
test both by having no secular legislative purpose, and by having the proscribed effect of inhibiting 
religion.  Id. at 251–52.  This is because some churches were subjected to “far more rigorous require-
ments than others.”  Id. at 258 (White, J., dissenting).  While the District Court found this requirement 
violated the second Lemon test by inhibiting religion, the Court of Appeals found that the requirement 
violated the first Lemon test by failing to have a secular legislative purpose.  Id. at 258–59. 
 77. See Mariam Morshedi, Levels of Scrutiny, SUBSCRIPT L. (Mar. 6, 2018), https://www.sub-
scriptlaw.com/blog/levels-of-scrutiny. 
 78. See Larson, 456 U.S. at 244.  What constitutes a close fit to a compelling state interest in child 
custody cases with religious upbringing clauses is fleshed out in Part IV of this article; however, in 
sum, this typically involves the state’s concern for the threatened well-being of the child.  See infra 
Part IV. 
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of the parties’ children.79  In both cases, the contracts were ultimately left in-
tact absent a showing of harm to the children.80  In Weisberger v. Weisberger, 
the appellate court corrected the lower court’s constitutional blunder of shift-
ing parental custody—thereby gutting the antenuptial contract—without a 
showing that harm justified modification of the agreement.81  In Spring v. 
Glawon, the court compelled the mother to remove her son from a religious 
school on the grounds that it violated a (non)religious upbringing clause, find-
ing that she failed to prove removal would be sufficiently harmful to justify 
modification of the agreement.82 
1. Weisberger v. Weisberger (2017) 
In 2015, the Supreme Court of Kings County, New York awarded Naftali 
Weisberger sole legal and residential custody of his children.83  Chavie Weis-
berger, Naftali’s ex-wife and mother to their three children, was awarded su-
pervised therapeutic visitation after failing to comply with a religious upbring-
ing document that required her to diligently observe the Hasidic faith.84  The 
 
 79. See Weisberger v. Weisberger, 60 N.Y.S.3d 265 (App. Div. 2017); Spring v. Glawon, 454 
N.Y.S.2d 140, 141 (App. Div. 1982). 
 80. See Weisberger, 60 N.Y.S.3d at 274–75; Spring, 454 N.Y.S.2d at 141–42.  
 81. See Weisberger, 60 N.Y.S.3d at 275.  The only justification for the state’s removal of the chil-
dren from their mother’s custody—as stipulated in the antenuptial agreement—would have been to 
demonstrate that remaining with their mother would cause the children harm.  Id. at 275.  Nothing in 
the record demonstrated that the children in that case would be harmed by remaining with their mother.  
Id.  The holding of Weisberger may be somewhat confusing in terms of the contract-constitution bat-
tlefield due to its dual rationales.  See id.  Since the antenuptial agreement stated that the children both 
would remain with their mother (Chavie) and be reared in accordance with the Hasidic faith, the con-
tract had to be enforced unless (1) it could be shown that remaining in Chavie’s custody would prove 
harmful to the children, and/or (2) it could be shown that continuing Hasidic practices would prove 
harmful to the children.  Id.  Since the father, Naftali, was unable to prove that it would be harmful to 
the children to remain with Chavie, removal was unjustified.  Id. at 175–76.  However, since Chavie 
failed to prove that continued practice of the Hasidic faith would be harmful to the children, the reli-
gious upbringing clause was enforced.  Id. at 275.  Therefore, the state’s position of non-interference 
absent a showing of harm was—by constitutional standards—correctly upheld by the appellate court 
in Weisberger.  See id. 
 82. Spring, 454 N.Y.S.2d at 142.  Thus, state interference in religious upbringing agreements is 
unjustified unless a contracting party can demonstrate that enforcement of the contract would harm 
the child.  See id.; Weisberger, 60 N.Y.S.3d at 275.  This standard is in line with Establishment Clause 
jurisprudence.  U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 83. Weisberger, 60 N.Y.S.3d at 272.  This included final decision-making authority over dental, 
medical, and mental health issues.  Id. 
 84. Id. 
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parties divorced in 2009 and signed a divorce settlement contract agreeing to 
joint legal custody of the children, while Chavie would have primary residen-
tial custody.85  Incorporated into the judgment was a stipulation directing the 
parents to raise the children in accordance with Hasidic customs “in all de-
tails.”86 
In 2012, Naftali moved to alter the stipulation of settlement so as to be 
granted sole custody of the children, as well as to compel Chavie to act in 
accordance with “Jewish Hasidic practices of ultra-Orthodoxy at all times.”87  
In support of his motion, Naftli alleged that Chavie violated the religious up-
bringing clause of the settlement by coming out publicly as a lesbian and al-
lowing the children to deviate from religious practice.88 
During the custody battle in the Brooklyn Supreme Court, Judge Eric Prus 
questioned Chavie for several days on her deviation from the ultra-Orthodox 
faith.89  Ultimately, the court determined that Chavie’s transition had caused 
a radical change of circumstances for the children, and it thus modified the 
divorce agreement so as to award Naftali temporary residential and legal cus-
tody.90  The court also granted the father’s motion to compel Chavie to prac-
tice full observance of the Hasidic faith.91 
Beginning its analysis, the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of 
 
 85. Id. at 268.  The divorce was implemented after Chavie confessed to being sexually attracted to 
other women.  Id. 
 86. Id.  This included both inside and outside of the home, in a manner that was “compatible with 
that of their families.”  Id.  The court also granted Naftali decision-making authority over which school 
the children would attend, while Chavie was responsible for getting the children to school in a timely 
manner and ensuring all their needs were provided for.  Id. 
 87. Id.  This included “sole legal and residential custody.”  Id.  Naftali alleged that Chavie’s “rad-
ically changed . . . lifestyle . . . .  [D]isparaged the basic tenets of Hasidic Judaism in front of the chil-
dren,” and for that reason, he moved to compel Chavie to act in accordance with the Hasidic faith 
“during any period in which she ha[d] physical custody of the children and at any appearance at the 
children’s school” in order to comply with the religious upbringing document.  Id. at 268. 
 88. Id. at 269.  This involved “allow[ing] the children to wear non-Hasidic clothes, permitt[ing] 
them to violate the Sabbath and kosher dietary laws, and referr[ing] to them by names that were not 
traditionally used in the Hasidic community.”  Id. 
 89. See Otterman, supra note 8.  Judge Prus’s questions included whether she permitted the chil-
dren to watch a Christmas video, whether she included Easter eggs as part of a Jewish holiday, and 
whether she used English nicknames for them.  Id. 
 90. Weisberger v. Weisberger, 60 N.Y.S.3d 265, 272 (App. Div. 2017).  The court described this 
as a transition toward a “more progressive, albeit Jewish, secular world.”  Id. 
 91. Id. at 269.  The court demanded that Chavie practice “’full religious observance in accordance 
with the [Hasidic] practices of Emunas Yisroel in the presence of the children,’ and ‘in . . . the com-
munity . . . [and] dress in the [Hasidic] modern fashion.’”  Id. 
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New York noted that modifying an existing custody agreement required a 
“showing that there had been a change in circumstances such that a modifica-
tion [was] necessary to ensure the continued best interests and welfare of the 
child[ren].”92  The Appellate Division also delineated a non-exhaustive list of 
factors that were relevant for determining what the best interest of the children 
would be.93 
Although the court conceded that a modification of the settlement agree-
ment was warranted by a change in the circumstances, it nonetheless found 
that the decision to award Naftali Weisberger sole legal and residential cus-
tody of the children “lacked a sound and substantial basis in the record.”94  
With regards to Chavie, the court concluded that directing her to practice full 
religious observance of Hasidic practices during periods of custody was 
 
 92. Id. at 273.  “The best interests of the child[ren],” the court noted, are to be “determined by a 
review of the totality of the circumstances.”  Id. (quoting Matter of Preciado v. Ireland, 2 N.Y.S.2d 
594 (App. Div. 2015)).  This standard is reminiscent of the neutral principles standard as upheld in 
Spring, and the compelling state interest upheld in Larson, in which a contract between two parties 
regarding their children’s upbringing will be scrutinized through neutral application of law unless and 
until harm to the child is threatened.  See Spring v. Glawon, 454 N.Y.S.2d 140, 142 (App. Div. 1982); 
see also Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 247–48 (1982).  Here, the contract between the parties 
stipulated that Chavie would have legal and residential custody over the children, and that both parties 
would raise the children in accordance with the Hasidic faith.  Weisberger, 60 N.Y.S.3d at 268.  De-
viation from this practice, then, would not justify removal, but instead a compulsion to enforce the 
document—as ordered by the court on appeal.  See id. at 275.  As stated by the court, modification of 
this agreement would require a showing of harm to the children.  Id. at 273.  Since it could not be 
shown that remaining in the mother’s custody would be harmful to the children, there was no justifi-
cation on the record for modifying the custody agreement.  Id. at 274–75.  In this way, the lower court 
erred in removing the children from Chavie’s custody, instead of enforcing the religious upbringing 
document.  See infra Part IV.B. 
 93. Weisberger, 60 N.Y.S.3d at 273.  These factors included: (1) “the quality of the home environ-
ment”; (2) each parent’s ability “to provide for the child[ren]’s emotional and intellectual develop-
ment”; (3) each parent’s financial stability; (4) each party’s relative fitness as a parent; and (5) the 
effect a change in custody would have on the “child[ren]’s relationship with the other parent.”  Id.  
The court also noted that the mother’s sexual orientation, which was raised at the hearing, required 
neutrality from the courts, in order for the focus to remain on the best interests of the welfare of the 
children.  Id.  The court also stated that the lower court’s determinations of the child’s best interest are 
afforded great weight and are not to be “disturbed unless they lack a sound and substantial basis on 
the record.”  Id. (quoting Trinagel v. Boyar, 893 N.Y.S.2d 636 (App. Div. 2010)). 
 94. Id. at 273–74.  Supporting its view, the court noted that Naftali was unable to demonstrate that 
awarding him sole custody of the children was in their best interest because their mother, Chavie, had 
been their “primary caretaker since birth.”  Id. at 274.  Moreover, the court determined that the chil-
dren’s intellectual and emotional development was strongly tied to their relationship with their mother.  
Id. 
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wholly improper.95  Relying on the Lemon Test in its analysis, the court rea-
soned that a person may not be compelled to adopt a particular religious life-
style at the behest of the court, as to do so would be a constitutional violation.96  
Further, the court found that there had been no showing that the mother’s 
newly adopted lifestyle was in anyway harmful to the children’s well-being.97 
The court ultimately reasoned that the best interest of the children was to 
continue observance of the Hasidic faith, but to remain primarily with their 
mother, as per the agreement.98  Finally, the court modified the religious up-
bringing clause to permit “each parent to exercise [their] discretion while the 
children [were] in [their] care.”99 
2. Spring v. Glawon (1982) 
In Spring v. Glawon, the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court en-
forced a religious upbringing clause stating that the child should be raised 
 
 95. Id. at 275.  The court stated that it was “wholly inappropriate to use supervised visitation as a 
tool to compel the mother to comport herself in a particular religious manner.”  Id. 
 96. Id.; see Lemon v. Kurtsman, 403 U.S. 602, 612–13 (1971).  To that end, the court explained 
that “a religious upbringing clause should not, and cannot, be enforced to the extent that it violates a 
parent’s legitimate due process right to express oneself and live freely.”  Weisberger, 60 N.Y.S.3d at 
275.  To support its reasoning, the court cited to Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 599 (1992), where the 
Supreme Court held that a court could not “compel a student to participate in a religious exercise,” 
and to include clergymen offering prayer as part of a graduation ceremony was not consistent with 
Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. 
 97. Weisberger, 60 N.Y.S.3d at 275.  This showing of harm is vital for Establishment Clause anal-
ysis, since Larson provides that the only exception for judicial interference in these categories of dis-
putes—discussed at length in Part IV—is potential harm to the child.  See infra Part IV.  Since there 
was no showing of harm, the religious upbringing clause maintained its force in this case, with a 
modification so as to permit Chavie to extricate herself from the contract’s rigorous religious demands.  
Weisberger, 60 N.Y.S.3d at 275. 
 98. Id. (reasoning that “the maintenance of the status quo is a positive value which, while not 
decisive in and of itself, is entitled to great weight” (emphasis added) (citing Matter of Moorehead v. 
Moorehead, 602 N.Y.S.2d 403, 405 (App. Div. 1993))).  Additionally, the court directed Chavie to 
“make all reasonable efforts” to ensure that the children comply with Hasidism, be it in response to 
direction from the father or the school.  Weisberger, 60 N.Y.S.3d at 276.  Naftali was awarded final 
decision-making authority over the children’s education and upbringing as it pertained to the Hasidic 
religion while in his custody.  Id.  Additionally, the court found it to be in the best interest of the 
children to keep a kosher home whilst in custody of both the mother and the father.  Id. 
 99. Id. 
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without religion, absent express written consent from both parties to the con-
trary.100  Dennis Spring, who is Jewish, and Adrienne Glawon, who is Catho-
lic, married in 1968.101  Following their divorce fifteen months later, Glawon 
was awarded custody of their son, Evan, with Spring retaining certain parental 
rights.102  The judgment contained a stipulation that the child should have no 
religious upbringing without express written consent by both parents.103  In 
1981, Evan reached school age, and Glawon enrolled him into St. Joseph’s 
Hill Academy (“St. Joseph’s”) over Spring’s objection.104  Consequentially, 
Spring brought a motion to both enforce the (non)religious upbringing clause 
and modify the agreement to award joint custody to both parents.105 
In its analysis, the court reaffirmed precedential holdings demonstrating 
that the court’s position was one of non-interference, and as such, the court 
could not be compelled to intervene unless there was a showing that the 
“moral, mental[,] and physical conditions [were] so bad as seriously to affect 
the health or moral[ilty] of [the] children.”106 
Glawon, the defendant-mother, contended in opposition that it was in 
Evan’s best interest to attend St. Joseph’s, but the burden was on her to prove 
that it would not be in Evan’s best interest to remove him from St. Joseph’s, 
in other words, that it would be harmful to remove him.107  The court con-
cluded that the agreement manifested between the parents as to the degree of 
religious upbringing of the child was ultimately best left intact, absent a show-
ing that enforcement would prove harmful.108  For that reason, Evan was re-
moved from St. Joseph’s and the custody agreement between the parties was 
left unchanged.109 
 
 100. Spring v. Glawon, 454 N.Y.S.2d 140, 141 (App. Div. 1982). 
 101. Id.  Their son, Evan, was born in 1975.  Id. 
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. 
 104. Id.  St. Joseph’s was a Roman Catholic parochial school.  Id. 
 105. Id. 
 106. Id. at 142 (quoting People ex rel. Sisson v. Sisson, 2 N.E.2d 660, 661 (N.Y. 1936)).  Further-
more, the court noted that precedential cases had consistently upheld the validity of religious upbring-
ing agreements, and that the party seeking to avoid or modify such an agreement has the burden of 
proving that its enforcement is not in the best interest of the child.  Id.; see also S.E.L. v. J.W.W., 541 
N.Y.S.2d 675, 679 (Fam. Ct. 1989). 
 107. Spring, 454 N.Y.S.2d at 142.  To support this contention, “she submitted a comparison of 
reading scores” between St. Joseph’s and other local schools, along with testimony about her experi-
ence as a public-school teacher for thirteen years.  Id. at 141–42. 
 108. Id. at 142. 
 109.  Id. 
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D. Child Custody Disputes Without Religious Upbringing Agreements 
Decided thirty-four years apart, the following two cases reach slightly 
different holdings in child custody disputes without a religious upbringing 
clause.110  In Ausch, the children were removed from their mother despite a 
lack of finding that it would be harmful to remain in her care.111  In Aldous, 
the appellate court found that the lower court had impermissibly entangled 
matters of church and state by allowing its credibility determination of the 
father’s religion to resolve the custody dispute in the mother’s favour.112 
1. Ausch v. Ausch (2018) 
In 2016, The Supreme Court of King’s County placed the children of Etty 
Ausch, Appellant, in temporary custody of nonparty relatives.113  Etty initiated 
her departure from the Hasidic community one year prior to the custody hear-
ing, alleging abuse by her ex-husband, Eluzer (Respondent).114  When Etty 
 
 110. Compare Ausch v. Ausch, 67 N.Y.S.3d 489, 489 (App. Div. 2018) (issuing a temporary order 
removing the children from the mother and placing them with nonparty relatives), with Aldous v. 
Aldous, 473 N.Y.S.2d 60, 62 (App. Div. 1984) (awarding permanent custody to the mother of the 
children).  While these two cases have reached different holdings, it is not necessarily accurate to 
describe them as being directly contradictory, since they both involve a unique set of facts, and the 
Ausch materials make it difficult to deduce how much consideration was given to the mother’s devia-
tion from religion in arriving at the final custody determination.  See Ausch, 67 N.Y.S.3d at 489. 
 111. Brief for Appellant at 33, Ausch v. Ausch, 67 N.Y.S.3d 489 (App. Div. 2018) (No. 2016-
09081). 
 112. Aldous, 473 N.Y.S.2d at 62. 
 113. Ausch, 67 N.Y.S.3d at 489.  The Supreme Court is the lowest court in New York.  Id.  The 
Appellate Division here references the lower court’s decision to temporarily place custody of the chil-
dren with nonparty relatives.  Id.  Notably, the presiding Justice in this case, as well as in Weisenberg, 
is Justice Prus.  Id.  Prus is an observant ultra-Orthodox Jew, and is often remarked as being “willing[] 
to wade deep into the details of religious practice in his Downtown Brooklyn courtroom.”  Otterman, 
supra note 8.  Currently, three of Etty’s children reside with her ex-husband, while the other four live 
with relatives.  See Josefin Dolsten, Why Did Netflix Cut ‘I’m Gay’ From Documentary About Ex- 
Hasids?, FORWARD (Mar. 5, 2018), https://forward.com/life/faith/395816/why-did-netflix-cut-im-
gay-from-documentary-about-ex-hasids/.  Etty motioned to vacate the order and regain custody of her 
children, but the court dismissed the motion on appeal.  Ausch, 67 N.Y.S.3d at 489. 
 114. See Otterman, supra note 8.  During the trial, Etty’s family and close friends attended to testify 
against her.  Id.  Those who have recently departed from Hasidism have opined that the community 
“has become more organized in how it aids the religious parent and ostracizes the parent leaving the 
fold.”  Id.  Like some of the aforementioned women, Etty’s changed lifestyle—including divergence 
from religious practices and exploration of homosexuality—was the subject of investigation at the 
proceeding.  See Raphelson, supra note 6 (“In her custody hearing, she faced a series of religiously 
pointed questions including one about fuzzy socks she bought for her children: Were they related to 
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and Eluzer first married and had children, both parties were Orthodox Jews.115  
In 2014, however, Etty was hospitalized for major depressive disorder, after 
which point Eluzer separated the children by placing them in five different 
relative’s homes.116 
In 2015, Eluzer commenced matrimonial proceedings in the County of 
King’s Supreme Court “on the grounds of irretrievable breakdown of the mar-
ital relationship.”117  During the proceeding, Dr. Adam Raff, the assigned ex-
pert forensic psychiatrist, testified that the children would “suffer emotionally 
and developmentally if they were separated from their mother.”118  Nonethe-
less, the Court issued a temporary order removing the three oldest children 
 
Christmas because they were dotted with snowmen?”).  Interestingly, in 2017 the appellate court in 
Weisberger admonished Justice Prus and the lower courts to remember that mandating a parent to act 
religiously is unconstitutional.  See Otterman, supra note 8.  It would seem that this admonition was 
ineffective, since only one year later, the same judge in the same court denied Etty’s appeal for custody 
for failure to maintain religious practice.  Id. 
 115. Brief for Respondent at 9, Ausch v. Ausch, 67 N.Y.S.3d 489 (App. Div. 2018) (No. 2016-
09081). 
 116. Brief for Appellant at 14, Ausch, 67 N.Y.S.3d 489 (No. 2016-09081).  Eluzer alleged that Etty 
suffered some post-partum difficulties after having seven children in eight years.  Brief for Respondent 
at 9, Ausch, 67 N.Y.S.3d 489 (No. 2016-09081).  Etty, on the other hand, attributes the source of her 
anxieties to the alleged emotional, physical, and sexual abuse she experienced in her marriage.  Brief 
for Appellant at 12, Ausch, 67 N.Y.S.3d 489 (No. 2016-09081).  Etty also alleged that Eluzer was 
physically and verbally abusive towards his children.  Id.  This includes “pinching and hitting the two 
oldest boys, pouring hot pepper in their mouths as a form of punishment, and continuously screaming 
at the three oldest children.”  Id.  Although Etty was released from hospital a month later, she alleged 
that Eluzer refused to allow the four youngest children to return home, claiming that Etty was not 
ready.  Id. at 14. 
 117. Id. at 16–17.  Three days after this, Eluzer moved to remove the three eldest children from their 
mother, requesting that he have custody over them, or to have them placed with separate family mem-
bers.  Id. at 17.  Notably, the motion was filed on a day when Judge Prus received the case as the 
assigned emergency judge.  Id.  This is significant because Judge Prus presided over another case with 
similar facts to this one (a child custody dispute with an allegedly homosexual mother lapsing in reli-
gious practice) around the same time.  Id.  In that case, Judge Prus allowed counsel for the Father to 
cross-examine Etty—a witness in the case—about her relationship with that mother.  Id. at 18.  There, 
“the Trial Court had previously made negative credibility determinations . . . and awarded custody to 
the ultra-Orthodox father.”  Id.  Moreover, Etty alleges that the Judge permitted Counsel to “exploit 
the Court’s intimate knowledge of that case and argue guilt by association against [Etty].”  Id.  Thus, 
when Etty appeared in front of Judge Prus for her own case, her credibility may have been negatively 
pre-determined.  See id.  Moreover, in New York, “[c]ustody determinations depend to a great extent 
upon the court's assessment of the credibility of the witnesses, as well as the parties' character, tem-
perament, and sincerity.”  Gribeluk v. Gribeluk, 991 N.Y.S.2d 117, 118 (App. Div. 2014).  Since Etty 
had been impeached in front of the judge before her own case had begun, it can be argued that her 
custody case was an upstream battle.  Brief for Appellant at 17–18, Ausch, 67 N.Y.S.3d 489 (No. 
2016-09081). 
 118. Id. at 22.  Dr. Raff went on to state that it “was best for the Children to remain in the care of 
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from Etty, and placing each with a different caretaker indefinitely.119 
In appellant’s brief, Etty argued that the trial court’s removal of the chil-
dren was unjustified under Article 10 of the Family Court Act, which requires 
a showing of neglect or abuse by the mother.120  Etty argued that none of the 
factors for the “best interest of the child” analysis—individually or collec-
tively—demonstrated that it was in the children’s best interest to be removed 
from their mother.121  The Appellate Division of the New York Supreme 
Court, however, upheld the trial court’s decision in denying her motion.122 
2. Aldous v. Aldous (1984) 
In Aldous v. Aldous, the Appellate Division of the New York Supreme 
Court held that the lower court had violated the Establishment Clause by im-
permissibly deciding on matters of religion in a child custody dispute.123  
Plaintiff, Catherine Aldous, and defendant, Philip Aldous, married in 1971 
 
[the] Mother, and with each other,” id. at 25, and “that the emotional bond between [Etty] and the 
three eldest children was the bedrock for their sense of stability and that they must remain in her care 
together for their mental and emotional well-being,” id. at 24.  Nonetheless, the court conducted a one 
hour in-camera hearing on June 30, 2016, during which the children displayed acts of aggression to-
ward their father, such as spitting at him and stating “[t]his is all your fault.”  Brief for Respondent at 
20–21, Ausch, 67 N.Y.S.3d 489 (No. 2016-09081).  In response to this, the court believed it would be 
in the best interest of the children to be away from their parents and “take a ‘time out’” for the summer, 
and so issued an order memorializing this decision on June 30, 2016.  Id. at 25. 
 119. Id. at 31–32.  In the Respondent’s brief, Eluzer argued that the Court’s decision to remove the 
children should be upheld, asserting that the removal was indeed in the children’s best interest.  Id. at 
29.  Eluzer argued that at the trial level, Judge Prus correctly followed precedent by directing the 
children to temporarily remain in the custody of other family members.  Id.  Eluzer argued that Etty 
had alienated the children from her family, from him, and from the community.  Id. at 30.  Without 
using the word “religion,” Eluzer described Etty’s “newfound beliefs” as imposing on the children 
without contemplating the harm it would cause them.  Id.  Finally, Eluzer cited Dr. Raff’s testimony 
in arguing that it was in the children’s best interest to remain in the Hasidic community to continue 
the lifestyle they had hereto forth been exposed to.  Id. at 30–31. 
 120. Brief for Appellant at 31, Ausch, 67 N.Y.S.3d 489 (No. 2016-09081). 
 121. Id. at 33.  Etty further argued that even if there was an actual risk of harm, such a risk must be 
balanced against the potential harm removal might bring.  Id. at 34.  Moreover, she stated, evidence 
must be presented to demonstrate that efforts were made to prevent removal where necessary.  Id.  Etty 
argued that no efforts were made to prevent the removal of the children from their primary caretaker.  
Id.  Finally, Etty moved to vacate the judgment ordering removal of the children from her custody, 
which was subsequently denied.  Ausch, 67 N.Y.S.3d at 489. 
 122. Ausch, 67 N.Y.S.3d at 489. 
 123. 473 N.Y.S.2d 60, 62–63 (App. Div. 1984). 
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and divorced a decade later.124  Together, the couple had two children, Kim-
berly and Jennifer.125  At the close of the initial child custody hearing, the 
court awarded permanent custody to Catherine, with visitation rights to 
Philip.126  In issuing its decision, the court stated, “[t]he lifestyle that [Philip] 
has chosen revolving himself around his church is not what the children want 
or need at this stage.”127  Ultimately, the court concluded that it was in the best 
interest of the children to stay with their mother.128 
On appeal, Phillip argued that the family court had entangled matters of 
church and state by inquiring into the religious tenets of a custodial parent.129  
On review, the court reiterated precedential authority holdings that religion 
may be considered as a factor in the overarching “best interest of the child” 
analysis, though it “may not be the determinative factor.”130  The appellate 
court found that the lower court’s determination to award the mother custody 
based on a finding that Phillip’s religious views were too discipline-orientated 
was constitutionally impermissible.131  Nonetheless, the court affirmed the de-
cision to keep the children in the custody of their mother on other grounds that 
were buttressed by the children’s “best interest” analysis.132  Thus, the court 
concluded that while the court’s endorsement of religious considerations over-
stepped constitutional boundaries, its analysis of other factors negated the 
contention that religion “tainted the final determination of custody or caused 
an abuse of discretion by the court,” as others factors strongly and sufficiently 
supported the finding that it was in the children’s best interest to remain with 
their mother.133 
 
 124. Id. at 61. 
 125. Id. 
 126. Id. at 62. 
 127. Id.  The court further stated that “[i]f [the father] were to be awarded custody, [the children’s] 
entire lifestyle would have to change to suit him and his new beliefs.”  Id.  
 128. Id.  To support its finding, the court stated that the children’s father was “more interested in 
forcing the children to conform to his beliefs than in what [was] best for the children.”  Id.  The court 
also noted that the main cause of the dissolution of the marriage was the difference in religious beliefs 
of both parties, and, “in particular, the requirements necessary to fulfill the principles and practices of 
the church to which [Phillip] is affiliated.”  Id. 
 129. Id.  Phillip argued that this entanglement was in direct violation of the Free Exercise Clause 
and the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment.  Id. 
 130. Id. 
 131. Id. 
 132.  Id. at 62–63. 
 133.  Id. at 63.  In other precedential cases, courts considered but ultimately did not uphold alleged 
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E. The Free Exercise Clause in Child Custody Disputes 
In S.E.L. v. J.W.W., the New York County Supreme Court decided the 
question of how to reconcile the right of a custodial parent to direct the reli-
gious upbringing of their child, with the right of the non-custodial parent to 
freely exercise religion during periods of visitation.134  Soraya Esteban Lebo-
vich (S.E.L.) and James Wilson (J.W.) divorced in 1987, resulting in custody 
of their child, Natalie, remaining with S.E.L.135  J.W. was a Jehovah’s Witness 
practicing “religious services, activities, and teachings.”136 
In reviewing J.W.’s visitation rights, the court grappled with the level of 
restrictions, if any, that should be placed on Natalie’s exposure to his reli-
gion.137  The court reasoned that, “[t]he right to free exercise of religion guar-
antees that a court will not make . . . a custody decision, based on its view of 
the respective merits of two religions,” and, “a non-custodial parent’s right to 
practice his or her religion will not be abrogated when the child visits except 
to the extent necessary to prevent any harm to the child.”138 
 
oral upbringing agreements.  Stevenot v. Stevenot, 520 N.Y.S.2d 197, 198 (App. Div. 1987).  In Ste-
venot, the Appellate Division of the New York Supreme Court held that absent a specified agreement 
as to the children’s religious upbringing, the authority to dictate their religious training vests in the 
custodial parent.  Id.  Plaintiff wife appealed a decision from the lower court, granting defendant hus-
band’s motion ordering her to raise their two children in accordance with the faith of the Congrega-
tional Church.  Id.  The dispute centered around an alleged oral contract made before the marital rela-
tionship, and then repeated during it.  Id.  The agreement, however, was not memorialized in the 
judgement of divorce, nor was it evidenced in any other writing.  Id.  The court stated that an oral 
agreement that had not been reduced to writing would not be binding following the dissolution of the 
marriage if the terms had not been included in a settlement or divorce judgment.  Id.  Finally, the court 
stated that without a contract, the custodial parent was the appropriate arbiter of the children’s religious 
upbringing.  Id. 
 134. S.E.L. v. J.W.W., 541 N.Y.S.2d 675, 676 (Fam. Ct. 1989).  Although not an appellate division 
case, the S.E.L decision is generally in line with Free Exercise Clause jurisprudence and can therefore 
be used as persuasive authority in this analysis.  See U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 135. S.E.L., 541 N.Y.S.2d at 676. 
 136. Id. 
 137. Id.  To determine this, the court looked to Free Exercise jurisprudence in its analysis, stating 
that “[a] Court Order Which Adversely Impacts A Non-Custodial Parent’s Free Exercise Of His Or 
Her Religion Would Be An Unconstitutional Infringement of First Amendment Rights When Based 
On An Assessment Of The Merits Of His or Her Religion.”  Id. at 677 (capitalization in original). 
 138. Id.  In delineating between consideration of religion against other child custody factors, the 
court cited relevant authorities that upheld the determination that, although religion is a permissible 
factor for consideration in child custody cases, it may not be the determinative factor.  Id.; see Aldous 
v. Aldous, 473 N.Y.S.2d 60, 62 (App. Div. 1984).  Instead, the court reasoned, religion is to be con-
sidered when the child has adopted a particular religion, and its observance is better facilitated by one 
parent than another.  S.E.L., 541 N.Y.S.2d at 677. 
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The court parsed through relevant precedent and determined that where a 
divorce settlement agreement existed pertaining to the religious upbringing of 
a child, the burden of preventing its enforcement fell on the party wishing to 
“modify or avoid” it.139  The court concluded that, because J.W. had agreed in 
a stipulation of settlement “that S.E.L would have absolute custody and ex-
clusive supervision, control and care” of their daughter Natalie, the burden 
fell on him to prove that denying Natalie exposure to Jehovah’s Witness prac-
tices would not be in her best interests.140  In other words—that exposure to 
his religion would not be harmful to their child.141 
The next step of the court’s analysis was to consider whether J.W. had 
waived his Free Exercise right by agreeing to the separation document.142  In 
its analysis, the court stated that although it was sensitive to J.W.’s First 
Amendment claim, “the situation is further complicated because rights of 
Constitutional dimension can be freely waived.”143  The court reasoned that 
when J.W. agreed to bestowing “exclusive supervision, control and care” to 
S.E.L., he had effectively forfeited his free exercise right of practicing his re-
ligion during visitation periods.144  Finally, the court concluded that because 
J.W. had contracted away his First Amendment rights, and because he failed 
to demonstrate that exposure to his religion would not be harmful to the child, 
J.W. would only be allowed to include Natalie in his Jehovah’s Witness ser-
vices on Sunday without any further involvement.145 
 
 139. S.E.L., 541 N.Y.S.2d at 679.  The court reached these conclusions by comparing Gruber v. 
Gruber, 451 N.Y.S.2d 117, 118 (App. Div. 1982) and Spring v. Glawon, 454 N.Y.S.2d 140, 141 (App. 
Div. 1982), both dealing with separation agreements and their enforceability as it pertains to the up-
bringing of the child, with Bentley v. Bentley, 448 N.Y.S.2d 559, 559–60 (App. Div. 1982), where no 
such agreement existed.  S.E.L., 541 N.Y.S.2d at 679. 
 140. S.E.L., 541 N.Y.S.2d at 677. 
 141. Id. 
 142. Id.  The court stated that such a right requires that the merits of each parent’s religion are not 
evaluated in rendering the custody decision.  Id. at 680.  Further, the court stated that the Free Exercise 
Clause “guarantees that no limitation will be placed on a non-custodial parent's right to practice his or 
her religion when the child visits except to the extent necessary to prevent any harm to the child.”  Id. 
 143. Id. at 679.  See supra Section II.B (discussing waiver of Free Exercise rights). 
 144. S.E.L., 541 N.Y.S.2d at 679. 
 145. Id.  Nonetheless, the court found that while Free Exercise rights may be contractually waived, 
such a waiver does not vest absolute religious decision-making authority to the other parent.  See id.  
While S.E.L had the legal right to determine Natalie’s religion, that right did not authorize her to 
prohibit absolute exposure J.W.’s faith.  Id. at 680. 
[Vol. 47: 777, 2020] Contracts and the Constitution in Conflict 
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW 
802 
IV. ANALYSIS 
A. To What Extent May Courts Consider Religion in Child Custody 
Disputes? 
The first point of inquiry involves determining how much latitude courts 
have to consider religion in child custody disputes.146  While courts look to a 
number of factors in determining the best interest of the child, a judicial fluster 
has historically occurred when determining the extent to which religion may 
be factored into its analysis.147  In an attempt to smuggle religion into the “best 
interest” analysis, a number of courts have historically considered a parent’s 
religious practices as linking directly to the child’s temporal wellbeing.148  
Other courts have made no such attempt to merge religion with the “best in-
terest” factorial analysis, instead simply weighing the merits of one religion 
against the other.149  Nonetheless, it has become clear that whatever guise re-
 
 146. See supra Section III.C.  The central cases for the purposes of this discussion, as mentioned in 
Part III, are Ausch v. Ausch, 67 N.Y.S.3d 489 (App. Div. 2018); Aldous v. Aldous, 473 N.Y.S.2d 60, 
63 (App. Div. 1984); and Stevenot v. Stevenot, 520 N.Y.S.2d 197, 198 (App. Div. 1987).  Since the 
Establishment Clause is a subsect of the First Amendment, this constitutional protection extends to all 
states, and thus, the lens need not be narrowed to examine the governing New York standard alone.  
See U.S. CONST. amend. I.  Nonetheless, states may individually possess statutes that provide judicial 
guidelines for how the best interest of the child is to be evaluated.  See MICH. L. REV. ASS’N, supra 
note 38, at 1702.  The statutorily prescribed factors to be considered in New York are listed in Section 
III.A. ((1) “[T]he quality of the home environment”; (2) the parental guidance provided by the custo-
dial parent; (3) each parent’s ability “to provide for the child[ren]’s emotional and intellectual devel-
opment”; (4) each parent’s financial status, including their respective abilities to provide for the chil-
dren; (5) each parent’s relative fitness; and (6) the effect a grant of custody to one parent would have 
on the “child[ren]’s relationship with the other parent.”);  see also cases cited supra note 93. 
 147. See George L. Blum, Annotation, Religion as Factor in Child Custody Cases, 124 A.L.R. 5th 
203, 203 (2004). 
 148. See, e.g., Blackley v. Blackley, 204 S.E.2d 678, 681 (N.C. 1974) (explaining that the trial court 
considered the mother’s religiousness in order to determine whether the home environment would 
encourage the development of the child’s mental, physical, spiritual, and moral faculties).  One study 
contemplating the link between religion and emotional wellbeing proved inconclusive.  See Donald L. 
Beschle, God Bless the Child?: The Use of Religion as a Factor in Child Custody and Adoption Pro-
ceedings, 58 FORDHAM L. REV. 383, 407 (1989) (finding “marginal support for a positive effect of 
religion”).  Historically, courts have used three different approaches to considering religion in child 
custody disputes: (1) religion as advancing the best interest of the child; (2) religion as threatening the 
child’s well-being; and (3) flatly preferring one religion over another.  Jennifer Benning, A Guide for 
Lower Courts in Factoring Religion into Child Custody Disputes, 45 DRAKE L. REV. 733, 742–45 
(1997). 
 149. See, e.g., Reaves v. Reaves, 399 So. 2d 311, 312–13 (Ala. Civ. App. 1981). 
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ligious preference takes, it risks running afoul of the Lemon Test if misguid-
edly applied.150 
1. Religion as Merging in the “Best Interest” Analysis 
The first subset of this issue asks whether merging religion into the “best 
interest” analysis is permissible.151  At first blush, this would appear to be a 
constitutionally viable determination.152  For example, considering the reli-
gious beliefs of the child himself and contemplating how those beliefs can 
further the child’s welfare seems perfectly in line with First Amendment ju-
risprudence.153  Additionally, courts have jurisdiction to consider religion as a 
non-determinative factor in its custodial analysis.154  The danger arises, how-
ever, when courts go beyond this narrow constitutional sidestep and instead 
regard religion as positively impacting the quality of the home environment, 
thereby casting a proscribed credibility determination on religion.155 
In Aldous, the appellate court found that the family court had impermis-
sibly “entangled matters of church and state” when it held that the children’s 
lives would be negatively impacted by the father’s commitment to the church 
and awarded the mother full custody.156  The lower court had cast a credibility 
determination upon the father’s faith, resulting in a violation of the Lemon test 
by having the principal effect of inhibiting religion.157  The appellate court in 
Aldous forgave this constitutional lapse because, on proper consideration of 
the factors, they nevertheless weighed in favour of keeping the children with 
 
 150. See MICH. L. REV. ASS’N, supra note 38, at 1708; supra Section II.A.1. 
 151. See U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 152. See Beschle, supra note 148, at 417. 
 153. Id.  If the child himself states that he prefers one religion over another, placing him in the care 
of the custodian who is best able to nurture his faith does not offend the First Amendment, since the 
court is responding to the child’s preference, rather than its own preference.  Id.; U.S. CONST. amend. 
I. 
 154. See supra notes 52, 138 and accompanying text. 
 155. See Beschle, supra note 148, at 417.  Under the Establishment Clause, the government has no 
standing to make credibility determinations about religion.  U.S. CONST. amend. I.  Equally dangerous, 
still, is the converse premise that the presence of religion diminishes the home environment.  See 
Aldous v. Aldous, 473 N.Y.S.2d 60, 62–63 (App. Div. 1984). 
 156. Aldous, 473 N.Y.S.2d at 62–63. 
 157. Id.; Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612–13 (1971).  When the court makes a positive 
credibility determination about a particular religion, on the other hand, it has the proscribed effect of 
advancing religion.  Id. 
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their mother.158  Because the appellate court is tasked with equitably consid-
ering the best interest of the child factors, and because those factors consum-
mately proved the mother to be the appropriate custodian, the court correctly 
decided Aldous.159  Nonetheless, Aldous represents a long line of New York 
cases where appellate courts are forced to clean up lower courts’ sloppy con-
stitutional blunders.160 
In Ausch, Eluzer argued that Etty’s secularism would prove harmful to 
the children, and it would therefore be in the children’s best interest to remain 
within the Hasidic community.161  While the Ausch case is still ongoing, a 
review of Establishment Clause jurisprudence reveals that these contentions 
would violate the Lemon test—absent an actual showing of harm—by lending 
judicial credence to Orthodoxy and allowing its heightened credibility to 
swing the custodial vote.162 
On review, the distinction between permissible and impermissible uses of 
religion in “best interest” analyses seems to lie in the theory of religious 
agency.163  If a child professes belief in a particular religion, and the court 
 
 158. See Aldous, 473 N.Y.S.2d at 63 (“In sum, there is an abundance of evidence in this record to 
support the determination of custody as made, and although the court's consideration of religion may 
be impermissible in this case, its analysis of the other factors, fully supported in the record, negates 
any implication that religion, as an issue, tainted the final determination of custody or caused an abuse 
of discretion by the court.”). 
 159. Id. at 62–63.  The court discusses “other grounds” that support keeping the children with their 
mother, such as the fact that the children had been with their mother since birth, there was “evidence 
of the degradation of plaintiff [mother] by defendant [father] and his parents when the children were 
with him,” and “evidence of plaintiff's stable family life which permits her to care for the children all 
day on a daily basis.”  Id. 
 160. See supra Section III.C–D.  In the cases discussed in this Note, the appellate courts are fre-
quently correcting the lower New York courts’ misguided application of the “best interest” analysis—
impermissibly stepping on the First Amendments toes by making credibility determinations about re-
ligion, thereby regarding religion as positively impacting the child’s wellbeing.  See supra Section 
III.C–D. 
 161. Brief for Respondent at 30–31, Ausch v. Ausch, 67 N.Y.S.3d 489 (App. Div. 2018) (No. 2016-
09081). 
 162.  See Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612–14.  This would have the principal effect of advancing Hasidism.  
Id.  A review of Establishment Clause jurisprudence reveals that the government cannot overstep its 
bounds by giving undue weight to religion in child custody disputes.  See U.S. CONST. amend. I.  A 
review of precedential New York cases depicts a pattern of lower court decisions being overturned for 
impermissible deference to religion.  See supra Section III.C–D.  Moreover, Lemon defines the rele-
vant law—that the government violates the establishment clause where a law has no “secular legisla-
tive purpose,” but instead advances or inhibits religion.  403 U.S. at 612.  For that reason, analysis of 
Ausch is preordained with the presumption that inequitable consideration of religion will result in 
constitutional oversight.  Cf. 67 N.Y.S.3d at 489. 
 163. See Beschle, supra note 148, at 399, 417. 
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finds that her faith is intimately intertwined with her development, the First 
Amendment is not offended by a determination that continued religious prac-
tice is in the best interest of the child.164  This is because, in effect rather than 
in application, the state is divested of its power of partisanship by simply ad-
vancing the wishes of the child—whether or not they pertain to religion or 
secularism.165  In Ausch, however, the children expressed a preference for re-
maining with their mother, an endorsement that could not be objectively tied 
to a demand for stringent religious development in the custody of an alien 
caregiver.166 
In sum, courts avoid stepping on the First Amendment’s toes when spot-
lighting religion in the “best interest” analysis only when responding to the 
child’s self-professed religious demands.167  Otherwise, where religion creeps 
into custodial determinations under the guise of the child’s best interest, but 
the court determines on its own accord that the presence of religion would 
either advance or inhibit the quality of the family environment, the second 
prong of the Lemon test is implicated, resulting in a violation of the Establish-
ment Clause.168  Therefore, religion may be considered a paramount factor if 
it comports with the child’s preference, but it may not be the determinative 
factor if it comports solely with the state’s preference.169 
 
 164. See id. 
 165. See id.  Instead of the court having an opportunity to prefer a religion, the child chooses the 
religion and the court memorializes this choice in its custodial order.  Id. at 399. 
 166. Brief for Appellant at 9–10, Ausch, 67 N.Y.S.3d at 489 (No. 2016-09081) (“[T]he Children's 
expressed wishes are to remain with each other and with their Mother . . . .  The children have also 
strongly expressed to their Mother, the expert forensic psychiatrist, and the caseworkers who con-
ducted the Court Ordered Investigation ("COI") that they wish to live with her.  The expert forensic 
psychiatrist also opined that the three eldest children have a strong bond to their Mother and to each 
other, and should remain together.  The Trial Court erred in removing the three Children from their 
Mother and placing them with three separate caregivers.”). 
 167. See Beschle, supra note 148, at 417 (“Seeking to determine and further the religious beliefs of 
a mature child can both further the child's welfare, particularly the child's need for stability, and protect 
a mature child's emerging free exercise rights.”). 
 168. See id. at 391–92, 417; Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612–13 (1971).  The Supreme Court 
in Lemon determined the governments appropriate latitude in religious disputes.  See id.  Under this 
standard, if a court makes credibility determinations about a particular religion in determining the best 
interest of the child, a constitutional violation occurs.  See id.  For example, when choosing between 
a Christian mother and a Jewish father, if the court deems the Christian faith as fostering a more 
hospitable home environment for the child, the decision to award custody to the mother offends the 
First Amendment by entangling matters of church and state.  See Beschle, supra note 148, at 420–21. 
 169. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. at 612–13; Beschle, supra note 148, at 417. 
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2. Weighing the Merits of Religion 
The next point of inquiry is whether courts may weigh the merits of one 
religion against another.170  This issue arises most often in child custody dis-
putes where both parents wish to provide the child with a religious upbringing, 
but each parent practices a different religion.171  Discussion of the Establish-
ment Clause hitherto should make it relatively clear that courts have no juris-
diction to prefer one religion over another.172  This type of improvident as-
sessment is known as “denominational preference.”173  The rule against 
denominational preference is best evidenced in Larson, holding that the gov-
ernment may not prefer one religion over another unless, under strict scrutiny, 
such a preference is tied to a compelling state interest.174  The promise of Lar-
son, however, has left a lot to be desired, and in application has proven both 
dubious and inconsistent.175 
Despite the ambiguity of Larson, the unconstitutionality of weighing the 
merits of one religion against another has uncontestedly proven to be the bed-
rock of the Establishment Clause.176  Further, even if Larsons’s strict scrutiny 
 
 170. On its face, this appears to be quite literally the evil that the Establishment Clause seeks to 
avoid.  See U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 171. See Beschle, supra note 148, at 400.  Such cases are becoming ever more prevalent as the rate 
of interreligious marriage and divorce increase exponentially.  Id.  These cases usually call for the 
merits of one religion to be weighed against the other in determining which avenue comports with the 
best interest of the child.  Id. 
 172. See U.S. CONST. amend. I.; Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612–13; Beschle, supra note 148, at 400. 
 173. See Patrick-Justice, supra note 76, at 54–55.  The rule against denominational preference is 
grounded in “strong historical roots” and is (almost) unanimously considered to be one of “the most 
fundamental guarantees of religious freedom.”  Id.  Even the most conservative members of the Su-
preme Court, Justices Rehnquist and Scalia—who have long criticized the notion of separation of 
church and state—agree that denominational preference is constitutionally proscribed.  Id. at 55.  De-
spite the fluctuation among the courts regarding religion in the law, this is one area that most unani-
mously agree.  Id. 
 174. See Larson v. Velente, 456 U.S. 228, 246 (1982); supra Section III.B.  To recap, the Larson 
court concluded that the Establishment Clause prohibited the preference of one denomination over 
another, except in the rare cases in which denominational biases were justified by a “close[] fit[]” to a 
compelling state interest.  456 U.S. 228 at 247.  The identification of this compelling state interest in 
child custody disputes is discussed in the remaining body of this analysis.  See infra Section IV.A.2. 
 175. See Patrick-Justice, supra note 76, at 55–56 (“[L]ower courts apply [the strict scrutiny test] in 
an inconsistent manner, and the meaning and correct application of the case [is] still unclear over 
twenty years after it was decided. . . .  Further, the case is not included in most casebooks on religious 
freedom or general constitutional law and is therefore not well known to most emerging legal schol-
ars.”). 
 176. See id. at 55; Larson, 456 U.S. at 244; Beschle, supra note 148, at 400; see also U.S. CONST. 
amend. I. 
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test was to consummately materialize in a string of twenty-first century cases, 
courts would be hard-pressed to deem the religious preference of one custodial 
parent over another as a “close[] fit[]” to a compelling government interest.177  
The only exception to this—and where Larson finds its force—is in cases 
where a particular religion poses a clear and imminent threat to the child’s 
well-being.178  In such a case, the compelling interest that gives constitutional 
credence to judicial intervention in private religious affairs is the state’s inter-
est in protecting the child from harm.179  Such cases, however, are rare, and 
typically involve one parent’s conversion to an extremist sect, endangering 
the welfare of the child.180 
Larson’s non-interference-absent-harm standard frames the constitu-
tional standard for considering religion in child custody cases.181  Thus, the 
First Amendment means courts can rarely—if ever—weigh the merits of one 
religion against another in making child custody determinations.182  The ex-
ception to this rule, as provided by Larson, is when a danger to the child’s 
 
 177. Matters of the religion in the home very rarely justify intrusion by the state for any compelling 
interest, absent a showing of harm to the child.  See Beschle, supra note 148, at 400–01; Larson, 456 
U.S. at 247. 
 178. See Beschle, supra note 148, at 400–01. 
 179. Id. 
 180. Id. at 401; see, e.g., Burnham v. Burnham, 304 N.W.2d 58, 60 (Neb. 1981).  There, the Su-
preme Court of Nebraska found that a mother’s involvement in an ultra-conservative sect created an 
impending danger for the welfare of her child.  Id. at 60–62.  The mother—the defendant in that case—
believed that because her marriage was illegitimate, her daughter was therefore also illegitimate, and 
proved willing to cut her daughter out of her life were she not to obey the rules of the church.  Id. at 
60–61.  The court reasoned that because the child’s welfare was endangered by the defendant’s reli-
gious affiliation, it would be in the child’s best interest to place her in the permanent custody of her 
father.  Id. at 62.  Burnham is an example of the minority cases in which a compelling state interest—
the well-being of the child—overrides the governments neutrality requirement under the Establish-
ment Clause.  See id.; see U.S. CONST. amend. I.  Even though Burnham never explicitly mentioned 
Larson or the strict scrutiny test, even a cursory reading of the case illustrates that the compelling 
governmental interest of protecting the child from her ultra-conservative parent licensed the court to 
prefer one parent over the other on religious grounds in determining the best interest of the child.  See 
Burnham, 304 N.W.2d at 61 (showing that during questioning, defendant was asked “if [your daugh-
ter] disobey[ed] the rules of the Church, [would you be] willing to cut her off from your life?” To 
which she responded, “[i]f she disobeys the laws of the Church, I would” and, “[t]he laws of the 
Church are the laws of the Church”). 
 181. See Larson, 456 U.S. at 244–46.  Under Larson, the government is not permitted to prefer one 
denomination over another unless the child’s welfare is in danger, in which case, the court would be 
permitted to prefer the alternative parent’s religion by virtue of a compelling state interest—protecting 
the child from harm.  See id. 
 182. See Beschle, supra note 148, at 400–01. 
[Vol. 47: 777, 2020] Contracts and the Constitution in Conflict 
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW 
808 
welfare justifies judicial intervention by a compelling state interest in main-
taining the child’s wellbeing.183  In such a case, the court has standing to prefer 
one religion (or secularism) over another, by virtue of the injurious environ-
ment fostered by the other custodian’s religious beliefs.184 
B. How Do Religious Upbringing Clauses Alter the Court’s Analysis? 
The pièce de résistance of this discussion calls for an examination of how 
religious upbringing agreements alter the framework of the court’s analysis.185  
Fundamentally, the Establishment Clause does not, on its face, serve as a re-
striction on judicial consideration of religious upbringing clauses in child cus-
tody cases.186  That is, the agreement does not per se entangle matters of 
church and state, because the court is not creating a religious identity for the 
child, but rather, enforcing an identity that was contractually agreed upon by 
the parents.187  However, constitutional issues pertaining to these agreements 
manifest when lower courts misapply the law.188  A cursory analysis of histor-
ical New York cases depicts a constitutionally viable avenue for enforcing 
religious upbringing clauses.189 
In Spring, the court enforced the parties’ religious upbringing agreement 
in ordering the mother to withdraw her son from a Catholic school.190  The 
court reinforced its position as one of non-interference and asserted that it 
could not be compelled to intervene absent a showing of harm to the child.191  
 
 183. See Larson, 456 U.S. at 247.  In such instances, the danger to the child forces the court’s hand 
to determine the better custodial parent by virtue of their respective religious practices.  See Beschle, 
supra note 148, at 400–01. 
 184. See, e.g., Burnham, 304 N.W.2d at 61–62. 
 185. See infra Section IV.B (fleshing out how courts resolve custody disputes when a religious 
upbringing clause is present).  The pièce de résistance refers to “the best and most important or excit-
ing thing, often the last in a series of things.”  CAMBRIDGE DICTIONARY, https://dictionary.cam-
bridge.org/us/dictionary/english/piece-de-resistance (last visited Mar. 9, 2019). 
 186. See Martin Weiss & Robert Abramoff, The Enforceability of Religious Upbringing Agree-
ments, 25 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 655, 660 (1992). 
 187. See id. at 660. 
 188. See id. at 660–61. 
 189. See Spring v. Glawon, 454 N.Y.S.2d 140, 141 (App. Div. 1982); Gruber v. Gruber, 451 
N.Y.S.2d 117, 118 (App. Div. 1982). 
 190. 454 N.Y.S.2d at 142.  The provision stated that the child shall have no religious upbringing 
absent the express consent of both parents.  Id. at 141.  Thus, enrolling her son in a Catholic school 
violated the contract’s provisions.  Id. 
 191. Id. at 142. 
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Looking at Spring, a viable angle for enforcing a religious upbringing agree-
ment is through neutral application of contract law, unless and until the party 
opposing its enforcement can demonstrate that such application would not be 
in the best interest of the child.192  This theory comports with Establishment 
Clause jurisprudence by blending neutral principles of law with the Larson 
strict scrutiny test.193  The court neutrally enforced the upbringing clause with-
out subjectively weighing one religion against the other (or here, Catholicism 
against secularism), and took the position of non-interference absent a com-
pelling state interest that justified disturbing the agreement.194 
On one hand, Spring stands for the high bar of private contract rights in 
child custody cases.195  That is, in cases where a religious upbringing clause 
exists in a settlement agreement, courts are inclined to leave the document 
undisturbed unless the party seeking to avoid its enforcement is able to 
demonstrate that it is not in the best interest of the child to do so.196  In Spring, 
even though St. Joseph’s was a demonstratively good school—seemingly bet-
ter than local schools in the area—and only one block from his mother’s home, 
the court ruled in favor of immediately removing Evan from the school and 
enrolling him in a secular school in order to comply with the contract.197  On 
the other hand, Spring poaches Larson’s strict scrutiny standard by giving it 
constitutional force in the presence of religious upbringing agreements.198  
This consolidated standard therefore states that unless harm to the child justi-
fies state interference under Larson, neutral principles of law must govern the 
contract’s enforcement under Spring, without reference to any particular reli-
gion.199 
 
 192. Id.  Because the defendant-mother failed to demonstrate how enforcement of the agreement 
would negatively impact the child, the court was constitutionally justified in upholding the religious 
upbringing document.  Id. at 142. 
 193. See supra Sections III.A, IV.A. 
 194. See Spring, 454 N.Y.S.2d at 142. 
 195. See id. 
 196. See id.  Said simpler, the agreement will be modified or avoided only if the party moving to 
avoid it can prove that its enforcement would harm the child.  See id. 
 197. Id. 
 198. See id.; Larson, 456 U.S. at 244–46.  Larson’s standard, as applied, denies judicial evisceration 
of private custody contracts without a justifiable state interest.  See Larson, 456 U.S. at 247–48; 
Spring, 454 N.Y.S.2d at 142.  We have seen this standard set forth in denominational preference 
cases—that is, the court may not prefer one religion over another unless harm to the child warrants 
making such a credibility determination—however, Spring represents the first case in this Note where 
Larson extends over to cases with religious upbringing clauses.  See discussions supra Section IV.B.II. 
 199. See Spring, 454 N.Y.S.2d at 142.  Incidentally, that same year, the New York Appellate Court 
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Thirty-five years later, this legal standard was aptly memorialized in 
Weisberger.200  In that case, the appellate court found that because the lower 
court had leaned on the mother’s transition toward a “more progres-
sive . . . secular world” as a determining factor in removing the children, it 
implicated the Lemon test in having the proscribed effect of advancing (the 
Hasidic) religion.201  The court’s holding does not appear to abrogate the force 
of the religious upbringing clause altogether—indeed, the clause was modi-
fied rather than expunged—however, the order was modified because the trial 
Judge went beyond the First Amendment’s parameters by deeming a religious 
environment as better serving the interests of the children.202  Thus, the trial 
court failed to apply Spring’s neutral principles of law in enforcing the con-
tract, and state interference was not justified by Larson’s strict scrutiny test, 
because although the children’s best interest was paramount in determining 
the issue of custody there was no showing that the mother’s lifestyle was in 
anyway harmful to the children.203  Therefore, the court failed the Lemon test 
 
reached the same conclusion in Gruber v. Gruber, 451 N.Y.S.2d 117, 122 (App. Div. 1982).  There, 
the Court stated that “no reason appears why the provisions of the contract should be ignored.”  Id.  In 
that case, the parties’ religious upbringing agreement provided that “the CHILDREN shall attend a 
[Jewish school] providing Jewish religious training until the completion of the 12th grade.”  Id. at 118.  
On review, the Appellate Court found that “[t]he evidence in the record fail[ed] to support the notion 
that a [Jewish School] education, per se, [would] be detrimental to these children.”  Id. at 122.  Without 
a compelling state interest to justify interference, the court was bound by the terms of the agreement.  
See Larson, 456 U.S. at 247. 
 200. Weisberger v. Weisberger, 60 N.Y.S.3d 265, 273 (App. Div. 2017). 
 201. Id. at 272–73. 
 202. Id. at 273.  In doing so, the trial court missed the mark of the constitutional footsteps set forth 
by Spring and Gruber in their neutral application of contract law.  See discussion supra Section IV.B.I.  
The only standing the court had to avoid the antenuptial contact, which placed the children in their 
mother’s possession, was a showing that the children would be harmed by enforcing the contract and 
remaining with their mother.  See supra Section IV.I.  No such finding was evidenced on the record.  
Weisberger, 60 N.Y.S.3d at 275 (“There is no indication or allegation that the mother's feelings and 
beliefs are not sincerely held, or that they were adopted for the purpose of subverting the religious 
upbringing clause, and there has been no showing that they are inherently harmful to the children's 
well-being.”).  Additionally, the court may have had jurisdiction to consider religion as a paramount 
factor if indeed the children professed to preferring such an environment, and the mother was unable 
or unwilling to accommodate this demand.  See supra Section IV.I.  Once again, no such finding was 
evidenced on the record.  See Weisberger, 60 N.Y.S.3d at 275. 
 203. See supra Section III.B.I.  The only reason the religious upbringing clause in Weisberger was 
ultimately pulled apart was because both parties had authorized the court to disturb the agreement in 
conceding that a change in the circumstances warranted modification.  Weisberger, 60 N.Y.S.3d at 
273.  The father in that case failed to demonstrate that awarding him full custody was in the children’s 
best interest, and in fact, overwhelming evidence showed it would actually be harmful to remove the 
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by preferring the father’s Hasidism over the mother’s “progressive” lifestyle, 
and using this as justification for gutting the agreement and repealing the 
mother’s residential custody rights.204 
On reviewing the differences between child custody disputes with and 
without a religious upbringing clause over time, the same standard seems to 
apply inversely.205  When no agreement is present, courts may equitably con-
sider religion in its multi-factored analysis but it may not prefer one religion 
over another, unless a compelling state interest justifies such a credibility as-
sessment.206  On the other hand, when an antenuptial agreement delineates the 
preferred religious identity of the child, the contract is enforced unless a com-
pelling state interest justifies disturbing the agreement.207 
 
children from the mother.  Id. at 274.  For that reason, the religious upbringing clause had to be mod-
ified because its enforcement would result in harm to the children.  Id. 
 204. See id.; Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612–13 (1971); discussions supra Section III.A.  
The trial court erred not in considering the religious upbringing clause at all, but in considering it too 
much.  See Weisberger, 60 N.Y.S.3d at 274 (“In pertinent part, the court gave undue weight to the 
parties' religious upbringing clause, finding it to be a ‘paramount factor’ in its custody determination. 
‘When presented as an issue, religion may be considered as one of the factors in determining the best 
interest of a child, although it alone may not be the determinative factor.’” (quoting Aldous v. Aldous, 
473 N.Y.S.2d 60, 62 (App. Div. 1984))).  Weisberger demonstrates that the current legal standard is 
still reminiscent of Spring’s neutral-application-absent-harm standard, where Larson’s compelling 
state interest finds its force as the only means to survive strict scrutiny of state interference in religious 
upbringing disputes.  See id.; Spring, 454 N.Y.S.2d at 141; Gruber, 451 N.Y.S.2d at 118. 
 205. Compare Aldous, 473 N.Y.S.2d at 63 (where no religious upbringing clause existed), with 
Weisberger, 60 N.Y.S.3d at 272 (where a religious upbringing clause existed); see discussion supra 
Part IV. 
 206. See Aldous, 473 N.Y.S.2d at 63.  A clear-cut case where such a determination was viable was 
in Burnham, where the court found that a mother’s involvement in an ultra-conservative sect created 
an impending danger for the welfare of her child after she explicitly stated that “[i]f [my daughter] 
disobeys the laws of the Church, I would [cut her off].”  Burnham v. Burnham, 304 N.W.2d 58, 61 
(Neb. 1981). 
 207. See Weisberger, 60 N.Y.S.3d at 275.  An additional difference in incorporating religious up-
bringing clauses to child custody disputes as it relates to the Establishment Clause is that without the 
agreement, religion may be considered, and with the agreement, it must be considered.  Compare 
Aldous, 473 N.Y.S.2d at 63 (where no religious upbringing agreement existed), with Weisberger, 60 
N.Y.S.3d at 272 (where a religious upbringing clause existed).  Because contract law governs the 
enforcement of religious upbringing agreements, the danger of running afoul of the constitution pre-
sents a heightened challenge.  See Weiss & Abramoff, supra note 186, at 656–57.  The courts must 
therefore contemplate how to employ contract law without violating the First Amendment.  See id.  
Nonetheless, this challenge is neatly sidestepped by applying neutral principles of law in the “best 
interest of the child” analysis—that is, as per Larson, objectively enforcing the contract unless there 
is a compelling state interest that demands its rescission or modification, which typically manifests 
only in the rare circumstances where one parent’s religion is in danger of harming the child.  See 
Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 247–48 (1982); Burnham, 304 N.W.2d at 60–61. 
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C. Religious Upbringing Clauses Up Against the Wall: Free Exercise 
Implications and Structural Restraints on Government as Reducing 
Contractual Potency 
1. Waiving Free Exercise Rights 
The final point of analysis is considering whether enforcing a religious 
upbringing agreement runs the risk of violating the Free Exercise Clause, and 
if so, what rights are effectively waived by the agreement.208  In Weisberger, 
the Court stated that “a religious upbringing clause should not, and cannot, be 
enforced to the extent that it violates a parent’s legitimate due process right to 
express oneself and live freely.”209  For that reason, the court exclaimed that 
while it respected the parties’ agreement, the weight of the evidence did not 
reveal that it would be in the children’s best interest to have their mother “cat-
egorically conceal the true nature of her feelings and beliefs.”210  Unbe-
knownst to the court, it had created a new standard for constitutional protec-
tions up against contract law.211  That standard suggests that even though a 
parent has contractually agreed to raise her children in accordance with a par-
ticular faith, the court will not enforce the clause wholly, but instead modify 
it to balance the children’s religious practices with the parent’s right to freely 
 
 208. See infra Section IV.C.  As previously discussed, an obvious danger in enforcing a religious 
upbringing clause—thereby compelling one parent to act in conformity with a particular religion—is 
violating the protections of the Free Exercise Clause.  See U.S. CONST. amend. I.  Free Exercise rights 
of parents are one of the most obviously protected constitutional rights in child custody cases.  See 
Beschle, supra note 148, at 414 (“Insisting that parents curtail religious practices or violate religious 
precepts in order to gain or retain rights of custody or visitation raises serious constitutional questions. 
Rules should be structured at least to minimize any interference with parents' free exercise of reli-
gion.”). 
 209. Weisberger, 60 N.Y.S.3d at 275.  The court also spoke to parental due process rights in ex-
claiming “it is beyond dispute that, at a minimum, the Constitution guarantees that government may 
not coerce anyone to support or participate in religion or its exercise.”  Id. (citing Lee v. Weisman, 
505 U.S. 577, 587 (1992)).  While this Note has focused on the Free Exercise Clause in conjunction 
with the Establishment Clause in the interest of brevity, the relationship between free exercise rights 
and parents’ substantial due process right to direct the upbringing of their children have historically 
been closely linked—sometimes even confused.  See Bybee, supra note 37, at 890.  As previously 
discussed, free exercise issues typically occur when “a parent must choose between religious practices 
and custody or visitation of children.”  See Beschle, supra note 148, at 416. 
 210. Weisberger, 60 N.Y.S.3d at 275.  The court also found that it would be improper to “otherwise 
force her to adhere to practices and beliefs that she no longer shares.”  Id. 
 211. See id. 
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express herself.212  Indeed, any other holding would traverse public policy, 
and for that reason, Weisberger sets forth an attractive new standard for lower 
courts to contemplate.213 
The question remains, however, whether Chavie—the mother in Weis-
berger—and other parents in her position waived their constitutional protec-
tions in signing the religious upbringing document.214  As previously dis-
cussed, a party may forgo his Free Exercise rights by entering into an 
agreement that effectively nullifies those rights.215  In this way, contractual 
provisions may defeat constitutional protections.216  In bringing a Free Exer-
cise challenge to the enforcement of a religious upbringing clause, then, the 
very obvious response is to produce the document itself, with the complain-
ant’s signature, as evidence of the rights forgone.217 
In S.E.L., the New York Supreme Court found that while “[a] Court Order 
Which Adversely Impacts A Non-Custodial Parent’s Free Exercise Of His Or 
Her Religion Would Be An Unconstitutional Infringement of First Amend-
ment Rights,”218 equally relevant was the fact that J.W., the father, had agreed 
in a stipulation of settlement that S.E.L, the mother, would have “absolute 
 
 212. Id. at 276.  The agreement was modified to require that the mother still maintain a Kosher diet 
in the home at all times, but permitted both parents to otherwise exercise discretion while having the 
children in their custody.  Id. 
 213. See id. at 275–76.  Any public policy concerns related to religious upbringing agreements lie 
not within the formation of the agreement itself, but instead, in its enforcement.  See Alexandra 
Selfridge, Challenges for Negotiating and Drafting an Antenuptial Agreement for the Religious Up-
bringing of Future Children, 16 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 91, 92 (2007).  In enforcing the contract, 
then, the court must temper public policy concerns by ensuring that parents’ First Amendment rights 
are not inadvertently flattened.  See id. (“No court has held that agreements between parents about 
their children's religious upbringing violate public policy or the criminal law.  The ‘public policy’ 
issue does not relate to the substance of the agreement, but rather to the enforceability of the agreement 
in the courts.”). 
 214. See Karel Rocha, Should Religious Upbringing Antenuptial Agreements Be Legally Enforcea-
ble?, 11 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 145, 149 (2000) (discussing whether Free Exercise rights are 
waived in contractual agreements). 
 215. See supra Section II.B. 
 216. See Thaler, supra note 59, at 1788.  This is less likely to be true if the contractual arrangement 
is made orally.  See Zummo v. Zummo, 574 A.2d 1130, 1145 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990); infra note 241 
and accompanying text. 
 217. See Rocha, supra note 214, at 149 (“[T]he most justifiable infringement is that which the par-
ties have chosen for themselves, rather than that which the court imposes upon them.” (quoting Jocelyn 
Strauber, A Deal Is a Deal: Antenuptial Agreements Regarding the Religious Upbringing of Children 
Should Be Enforceable, 47 DUKE L.J. 971, 1006–07 (1998))). 
 218. S.E.L. v. J.W.W., 541 N.Y.S.2d 675, 677 (Fam. Ct. 1989) (capitalization in original). 
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custody and exclusive supervision” of their daughter Natalie.219  The court 
concluded that because J.W. had agreed to abandon parental authority in the 
contract, he had forfeited his free exercise right of practicing his religion dur-
ing visitation periods.220 
S.E.L. stands for the proposition that religious freedom, as protected by 
the Free Exercise Clause, is discernably waived through freedom of contract-
ing—pitting contract law above constitutional law—while Weisberger, 
twenty-eight years later, takes a slightly more sensitive approach in holding 
that a parent cannot be compelled to practice religion in order to maintain 
unsupervised custody, allowing constitutional protections to defeat contract 
law.221  Perhaps, however, these disparate holdings can be attributed to the 
notable differences between the two cases.222  In S.E.L, the father wished to 
expose his daughter to Jehovah’s Witness practices, and failed to show how 
this exposure would not harm her.223  In Weisberger, however, short of want-
ing to expose her children to a new or different faith, the mother in that case 
wished simply not to feign religious practice in front of her children in order 
to maintain custody.224  Thus, less leniency is seemingly granted where a par-
ent is attempting to expose her child to a new or existing religion, as in S.E.L., 
than if a parent is attempting to extricate herself from the rigidity of an ultra-
conservative practice, as in Weisberger.225  In sum, when considering the Free 
Exercise Clause in relation to religious upbringing clauses, modern courts are 
rightly shifting toward a standard of fairness, and weighing constitutional pro-
tections as a heavier priority over contractual provisions.226 
  
 
 219. Id. at 679. 
 220. Id. 
 221. Compare Weisberger v. Weisberger, 60 N.Y.S.3d 265, 275 (App. Div. 2017), with S.E.L., 541 
N.Y.S.2d at 679. 
 222. Compare Weisberger, 60 N.Y.S.3d at 275, with S.E.L., 541 N.Y.S.2d at 679. 
 223. S.E.L., 541 N.Y.S.2d at 679. 
 224. Weisberger, 60 N.Y.S.3d at 275. 
 225. Compare Weisberger, 60 N.Y.S.3d at 275, with S.E.L., 541 N.Y.S.2d at 679.  Additionally, the 
court in Weisberger likely took stock of the fact that the mother, there, was not privy to the terms of 
the contract, and therefore holding her to the agreement would be unconscionable.  See Raphelson, 
supra note 6; Otterman, supra note 8.  For that reason, courts likely consider the level of agency in 
contractual agreements before determining whether Free Exercise rights have been effectively waived.  
See supra Section II.B. 
 226. See Rocha, supra note 214, at 150. 
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2. Defenses to Waiver Challenges and Structural 
Restraints on Government 
Even in the face of a waiver challenge, a party may provide contract de-
fenses to counter the agreement’s enforceability.227  As in Weisberger, Chavie 
and many other women in her position have been the victim of an antenuptial 
agreement, rather than the proponent of it.228  Whether defenses of duress or 
unconscionability apply are case specific inquiries, and depending on the vi-
ability of the defense, may serve to vitiate the contract altogether.229 
However, although it is clear that in certain circumstances a person may 
waive their Free Exercise right, and indeed, the court may in its discretion 
uphold such a waiver in enforcing the agreement, the potency of the contract 
is nonetheless diminished by structural restraints imposed on the govern-
ment.230  That is to say, while a person may waive her free exercise right, she 
may not waive the neutrality requirement imposed on the government in con-
straining entanglement of church and state.231  For that reason, if the state 
oversteps its bounds by giving judicial deference to religion in child custody 
disputes, as did the trial court in Weisberger, no contractual provision can 
relieve the trial judge of his constitutional transgression.232  Thus, while a per-
son’s free exercise rights may be contractually waived, the Establishment 
Clause’s structural restraint on government maintains its force over religion 
in the courtroom, diminishing the efficacy of the agreement’s force.233 
 
 227. See supra Section III.C. 
 228. See Otterman, supra note 56 and accompanying text. 
 229. See supra note 62 and accompanying text; Shelley Smith, Reforming the Law of Adhesion 
Contracts: A Judicial Response to the Subprime Mortgage Crisis, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1035, 
1092 (2010) (“[O]ne who signs an agreement without full knowledge of its terms might be held to 
assume the risk that he has entered a one-sided bargain.  But when a party of little bargaining 
power . . . signs a[n] . . . unreasonable contract with little or no knowledge of its terms, it is hardly 
likely that his consent . . . was ever given to all the terms. In such a case the usual rule that the terms of 
the agreement are not to be questioned should be abandoned and the court should consider whether 
the terms of the contract are so unfair that enforcement should be withheld.” (quoting Williams v. 
Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445, 449–50 (D.C. Cir. 1965))). 
 230. See Hayden, supra note 63, at 243–44. 
 231. See id.; U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 232. See Hayden, supra note 63, at 243–44. 
 233. See U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
So, what becomes of the vulnerable teenager who married a stranger she 
met but once?234  What becomes of the autonomy she lost over her body, her 
faith, and the children she bore?235  Is her latent realization of the woman she 
wanted to be crippled by her consent to a life she wants to forget?236  Lower 
New York courts have continuously said yes, but appellate courts have con-
stitutionally said no.237 
When religious upbringing clauses bring contracts and the Constitution 
into conflict by compelling courts to consider religion, the Establishment 
Clause of the First Amendment guarantees that, although religion is a contrac-
tually obligatory point of consideration, it cannot be the determinative factor 
in child custody decisions.238 
 
 234. See Yoked, supra note 1. 
 235. See id.; Dolsten, supra note 6 and accompanying text; Ausch, supra note 6. 
 236. In the two most current cases discussed, the mother made the decision to come out as a lesbian 
and leave the Hasidic community.  See Ausch v. Ausch, 67 N.Y.S.3d 489, 489–90 (App. Div. 2018); 
Weisberger v. Weisberger, 60 N.Y.S.3d 265, 268–69 (App. Div. 2017); see also Ausch, supra note 6.  
In Weisberger, the mother was held to the signature on her antenuptial contract that promised to raise 
the children in accordance with the Hasidic faith.  Weisberger, 60 N.Y.S.3d at 276. 
 237. Weisberger, 60 N.Y.S.3d at 275–76; Spring v. Glawon, 454 N.Y.S.2d 140, 141–42 (App. Div. 
1982).  Although the religious upbringing clause was enforced in those cases, there was no holding 
that the mother had to conform with the stipulated religion.  Weisberger, 60 N.Y.S.3d at 275–76; 
Spring, 454 N.Y.S.2d at 141–42. 
 238. See Aldous v. Aldous, 473 N.Y.S.2d 60, 63 (App. Div. 1984); Gribeluk v. Gribeluk, 991 
N.Y.S.2d 117, 118 (App. Div. 2014).  In New York courts, if the antenuptial agreement states that the 
mother shall be the primary legal custodian, deviation from the religious upbringing clause will not 
warrant removal under the First Amendment or Article 10, but instead, the clause will be enforced to 
the extent that the children—not the mother—must continue their religious training while in their 
mother’s care.  See U.S. CONST. amend. I.; N.Y. FAM. CT. ART. 10 (2019); supra note 75 and accom-
panying text.  It is also noteworthy that while this holding may be typical in New York cases, many 
courts outside of New York disregard the clause altogether for being vague or ambiguous.  See Zummo 
v. Zummo, 574 A.2d 1130, 1144 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990) (“1) [S]uch agreements are generally too vague 
to demonstrate a meeting of minds, or to provide an adequate basis for objective enforcement; 2) 
enforcement of such an agreement would promote a particular religion, serve little or no secular pur-
pose, and would excessively entangle the courts in religious matters; and, 3) enforcement would be 
contrary to a public policy embodied in the First Amendment Establishment and Free Exer-
cise Clauses . . . that parents be free to doubt, question, and change their beliefs, and that they be free 
to instruct their children in accordance with those beliefs.”).  Although the contract in Zummo was an 
oral agreement, which counted against enforcement, the court there nonetheless spoke of public policy 
concerns that are not mentioned in precedential New York holdings.  Compare id. (where the religious 
upbringing agreement was not enforced, inter alia, due to public policy concerns that parents should 
be free to change their minds about their children’s upbringing), with Weisberger, 60 N.Y.S.3d at 275–
76, and Spring, 454 N.Y.S.2d at 141–42 (enforcing a religious upbringing document despite the 
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Although preferring one religion over another would have the proscribed 
effect of advancing or inhibiting religion, thereby failing the Lemon test, Lar-
son carves out an exception to this rule in circumstances where protecting the 
child’s well-being becomes a compelling state interest.239  Weisberger consol-
idates precedential New York holdings into the current state of legal analysis 
by finding that religion may not be the determinative factor for considera-
tion;240 the state may only interfere in private religious affairs if the child’s 
welfare is at stake;241 and neutral principles of law must govern over religious 
upbringing agreements in child custody disputes.242  The application of these 
neutral principles typically means that the contract will be left undisturbed as 
it pertains to the religious identity of the child, but a softened standard attaches 
to the religious identity of a parent who may have unwittingly waived her Free 
Exercise rights in signing the contract.243 
While a person’s free exercise rights may be contractually waived, the 
Establishment Clause’s structural restraint on government maintains its force 
over religion in the courtroom.244  In this way, while parents may not be free 
from waiver challenges to their Free Exercise rights, they are absolutely free 
from the danger of judicial deference to a religious upbringing clause.245  
Thus, giving undue weight to religious upbringing clauses in child custody 
cases violates the First Amendment of the Constitution, and even in the pres-
ence of contractual agreements, such a violation always survives a waiver 
challenge.246 
 
mother in both cases changing her mind about her children’s upbringing). 
 239. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612–13 (1971); see also Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 
228, 244, 246–47 (1982).  This holding was ratified in Spring, alongside an application of “neutral 
principles of law” to contract enforcement.  See Spring, 454 N.Y.S.2d at 141–42; Larson, 456 U.S. at 
244. 
 240. Aldous, 473 N.Y.S.2d at 63. 
 241. Larson, 456 U.S. at 246–47.  While this type of harm is usually in the context of a parent who 
joins an ultra-conservative sect that threatens punishment to the child, see Burnham v. Burnham, 304 
N.W.2d 58, 60 (Neb. 1981), some courts find that divorced parents increase the risk of an injurious 
environment for the children.  See Zummo, 574 A.2d at 1140 (“Some divorced parents may conduct 
such religious upbringing disputes in a more acrimonious and injurious manner than parents who re-
main married, and thereby create greater risk of harm to their children in more such cases.”). 
 242. Weisberger, 60 N.Y.S.3d at 275. 
 243. Id.  This holding is typical in New York courts, but may not necessarily be true in other juris-
dictions.  See Zummo, 574 A.2d at 1144. 
 244. See U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 245. See supra Part IV. 
 246. See U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
[Vol. 47: 777, 2020] Contracts and the Constitution in Conflict 
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW 
818 
* * * 
Picture this: The parents of an estranged family push and pull at the judi-
ciary who, spurred by the albatross of constitutional propriety, tightrope the 
line between religious freedom and religious agreements.247  What is forgotten 
in the scramble for the biggest piece of the custodial pie?248  Regrettably, the 
story’s protagonist—the child.249  Fifty pages and three decades of dragging 
the First Amendment from pillar to post later, what is, after all, the best inter-
est of that child?250  Perhaps a less loaded question would be, what is not in 
the child’s best interest?251  When a contract foreordains the forever-interest 
of the child, little wiggle room is left for changes of heart, expansion of mind, 
and freedom of spirit.252  The writings in the custody contract, then, become 
the writings on the cradle wall.253  While lacking jurisdiction to expunge these 
writings, the First Amendment at least keeps the cradle door open by safe-
guarding parents’ Free Exercise rights and promising nonpartisanship in reli-
gious warfare.254  To that end, when a contract raises its sword in a child cus-
tody dispute, Chavie, Etty, and the women before and after them, are safe 
behind the shield of the American Bill of Rights.255 
 
 247. See Ausch v. Ausch, 67 N.Y.S.3d 489, 489–90 (App. Div. 2018); Weisberger, 60 N.Y.S.3d at 
275; Aldous v. Aldous, 473 N.Y.S.2d 60, 62–63 (App. Div. 1984). 
 248. See, e.g., Weisberger, 60 N.Y.S.3d at 275. 
 249. See, e.g., id. 
 250. See discussion supra Section III.A.  The “best interest of the child” is the touchstone of custo-
dial analysis.  See discussion supra Section III.A. 
 251. See discussion supra Section III.A. 
 252. See Zummo v. Zummo, 574 A.2d 1130, 1144 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990) (“[E]nforcement would be 
contrary to a public policy embodied in the First Amendment Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses 
(as well as their state equivalents) that parents be free to doubt, question, and change their beliefs, and 
that they be free to instruct their children in accordance with those beliefs.”). 
 253. “The writing on the wall” is an idiom that portends a destiny of misfortune.  See THE FREE 
DICTIONARY, https://idioms.thefreedictionary.com/the+writing+on+the+wall (last visited Sept. 23, 
2019). 
 254. See discussion supra Part IV; U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 255. See Bill of Rights of the United States of America (1791), BILL OF RIGHTS INSTITUTE, 
https://billofrightsinstitute.org/founding-documents/bill-of-rights/ (last visited Sept. 23, 2019).  The 
Bill of Rights are compromised of the first ten Amendments of the Constitution.  Id.  Since the Estab-
lishment Clause and Free Exercise Clause fall under the First Amendment, they fall within the Bill of 
Rights.  Id. 
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